Is anarchism inherently dualistic?

In his books, Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical and Total Freedom: Toward a Dialectical Libertarianism, and elsewhere, Chris Sciabarra relates Ayn Rand’s criticism (as well as his own) of the apparently dualistic nature of anarchism (especially Rothbard’s version). Sciabarra is far more sympathetic to anarchism than Rand ever was. In this post I will, for the sake of argument, accept that dualism is problematic. (Though I tend to agree that it is, I do not wish to debate this point here. Critics of this assumption are directed to Sciabarra’s work.) My argument is that anarchism is not inherently dualistic.

Note: Full appreciation of this post, since it is brief and sketchy, will require some familiarity with the sources discussed and cited herein.

To begin with, Sciabarra points out in Russian Radical that some have argued that Rand’s defense of individual rights logically commits her to anarchism even though she did not recognize it. Famously, Roy Childs made this argument on Objectivist grounds, though he later (mistakenly I think) recanted. Sciabarra also points out some anarchistic elements in Rand’s own political philosophy. For example, Rand opposed taxation as theft and conscription as slavery (see her essay “Government Financing in a Free Society” in The Virtue of Selfishness). A government that must rely solely on voluntary contributions (via donations, user fees, a lottery, etc.) would be one very unlike anything with which we are familiar. Rand’s definition of government does not necessarily entail a monopolistic institution: “Government is the means of placing the retaliatory use of physical force under objective control – i.e., under objectively defined laws” (“The Nature of Government” in VoS). However, her elaboration of her concept of government does require this. Rand’s contention that government requires a monopoly on the legitimate use of force in a given geographical area and that individuals must delegate their right of self-defense to this institution are the chief contradictions in her political philosophy. Interestingly, Rand apparently did not realize (and Sciabarra does not call her on it) that her definition of capitalism is inherently anarchistic: “Capitalism is a social system based on the recognition of individual rights, including property rights, in which all property is privately owned” (“What is Capitalism?” in Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal; emphasis mine). It seems to me that if all property is privately owned, then even Rand’s minimal State could not exist. At least some public property would have to exist and be controlled by government (the State) in order for it to fulfill its monopolistic role as provider of law, security, and justice. This seems to have escaped Sciabarra as well.

Rothbard supposedly sets up a dualism between market and State, a dualism that he apparently would prefer resolving itself into a monism of the market absorbing all of the functions of the State. Perhaps Rothbard was guilty of this to some degree, although I am not certain that this is the extent of Rothbard’s argument for anarcho-capitalism. In any event, I will here attempt to sketch out a nondualistic picture of anarchism.

To begin with, I submit that there are different kinds of anarchism and that Rothbard was aware of this. The following essays elaborate on these different types of anarchism: Alfred Cuzan’s “Do We Ever Really Get Out of Anarchy?” and James Ostrowski’s “The Myth of Democratic Peace.” Rothbard was familiar with Cuzan’s article in JLS. What Cuzan and Ostrowski argue is essentially this: Although the creation of numerous States gets the individual citizens of each out of anarchy with their fellow citizens, anarchy has merely been shifted to the international level between the States themselves. Moreover, anarchy still exists between the State and its subjects (ahem…citizens), between citizens of different States, and between States and the citizens of other States. Cuzan even argues that for States in which the power of government has some degree of separation of powers, the different branches of government are in a state of anarchy with each other because there is no overarching authority. Even the formation of a world government or World-State only eliminates international anarchy, not the other dimensions of anarchy. It is impossible to get completely out of anarchy. So the question then becomes not whether the State or anarchy is to be preferred, but which type of anarchy is to be preferred: Natural Anarchy, Hobbesian State Anarchy with or without Republican Anarchy, or World-State Anarchy with or without Republican Anarchy. (The terms for these categories are my own. See here for a rough illustration.)

To take my nondualistic view of anarchism further, one can combine the insights of F.A. Hayek and Albert J. Nock. For Hayek society is a spontaneous order within which exist numerous organizations (examples of planned order). One can conceive of a global society encompassing all of mankind on earth. Within the global society there are various governmental organizations called States. At this point, I would make Nock’s distinction between government and the State. Government is that institution or set of institutions that produce law, security, and justice without violating the rights of individuals. The State, on the other hand, is a governmental institution (and thus, I think, a perverted species of government), but by its very nature it violates the rights of individuals (citizens and noncitizens alike) and is parasitic upon society. The growth and encroachment of State power necessarily destroys social power (voluntary action, relationships, and exchange). With this distinction I would define the State as Rothbard has, as “that organization which possesses either or both (in actual fact, almost always both) of the following characteristics: (a) it acquires its revenue by physical coercion (taxation); and (b) it acquires a compulsory monopoly of force and of ultimate decision-making power over a given territorial area” (Ethics of Liberty, 172). Government is not monopolistic and need not be tied to a given geographic area; it is fully voluntary. Government, then, is compatible with anarchy (though my definition of government here is even more radical than that of Rand’s, but there always remains the danger that government will transform into a State. Although it is common among anarchists to emphasize that anarchy means ‘no government’ and not ‘no law’, under the view presented here anarchy does not necessarily have to mean ‘no government’ either but rather ‘no State’. Libertarian anarchy, or natural order, would still operate under the rule of law and, as Roderick Long has argued (here and here), radically decentralized constitutional restraints in the form of societal and market separation of powers, checks and balances (including but not limited to market competition).

Moreover, the market is on my view but one aspect of society, so my view is not a dualistic one of market vs. State, but rather one in which government and society are compatible within one of several different kinds of anarchy. While the State and society are still mutually opposed to one another, the State is a perversion of government. To co-opt a line from Ru
ssian Radical
, describing Rand’s view, for my own purposes: “the initiation of force is a crucial component in the genesis of social dualism” (298). It is, rather, the State and statism that introduce dualism into society and not anarchism. The State, especially the modern State, is a historical phenomenon that needs to be overcome, although this overcoming is not guaranteed and will entail a veritable revolution on multiple levels: psycho-epistemological, epistemological, ethical, socio-cultural, economical, political, legal, aesthetic. I wholeheartedly agree with Sciabarra and Rand that simply changing or attempting to change our political and/or economic institutions without changing the rest will be disastrous or impossible. We cannot ignore the necessary foundations and concommitants of a viable free society.

I have obviously only provided the barest of sketches, but I think this suffices to point the way to a nondualistic view of libertarian anarchism.

Addendum (07/13): I should add that the State is not the only organization, institution, individual or set of individuals in society that operates via the initiation of physical force. Achieving libertarian anarchy is no guarantee not only that our society will remain free but also that all forms of force initiation have been eliminated. Examples could be: sporadic or organized crime, abusive family relationships, private slavery, and so forth. I merely see the State as being the chief enemy of liberty; it is the most visible, the best organized, the most powerful, and has the advantage of economies of scale in terms of the ability to violate rights on a massive scale. It is the greatest threat to individual liberty, but not the only threat. Moreover, there are more subtle forms of coercion than physical coercion (or the initiation of physical force). We need to be concerned not only with political autonomy but also with social autonomy (or independence from blind obedience to authority and the social structures that promote such) and personal autonomy (or being a harmonious, rational, integrated being; not being alienated from our subconscious, our emotions, and our body; not being ruled by our passions, fears, drugs, etc.). I’ll blog more on these three dimensions of autonomy at a later date. Discussions of anarchism and statism deal primarily with the structural level of analysis, but we must also bear in mind the personal and socio-cultural levels. Check out Sciabarra’s response post for his take on anarchism and dualism. My brief comments don’t do justice to his position on anarchism, minarchism, and Rothbard’s political thought.

Geoffrey is an Aristotelian-Libertarian political philosopher, writer, editor, and web designer. He is the founder of the Libertarian Fiction Authors Association. His academic work has appeared in Libertarian Papers, the Journal of Libertarian Studies, the Journal of Value Inquiry, and Transformers and Philosophy. He lives in Greenville, NC.