On the Social Contract and the Persistence of Anarchy

By

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Abstract

Traditional social contract theory holds that the origin and purpose of government is to escape the state of nature and its perceived deficiencies. The state of nature is conceived of as being anarchic, meaning that there is no monopolistic common authority to provide security, determine the law, and adjudicate conflicting claims and secure compliance. It will be the argument of this paper that this attempt at justifying the State with social contract theory ultimately fails. We can never really get out of anarchy. The formation of states does not eliminate anarchy but rather transforms natural anarchy into other types, the most well-known and widely recognized of which is international anarchy (i.e., the anarchic relationship that exists between states in the international system). Even the formation of a World-State will not eliminate anarchy. It will be argued that there are at least four major types of anarchy, determined in large part by the structure of the power relationships within them. In light of this, the fundamental issue ceases to be whether the state or anarchy is to be preferred, but rather becomes which type of anarchy is to be preferred.
Anarchy, like matter, never disappears – it only changes form.
– Alfred Cuzan

Traditional social contract theory holds that the origin and purpose of government is to escape the state of nature and its perceived deficiencies. The state of nature is conceived of as being anarchic, meaning that there is no monopolistic common authority to provide security, determine the law, and adjudicate conflicting claims and secure compliance. In this paper I argue that this attempt at justifying the state with social contract theory ultimately fails. We can never really get out of anarchy. The formation of states does not eliminate anarchy but rather transforms natural anarchy into a number of other types, the most well-known and widely recognized of which is international anarchy (i.e., the anarchic relationship that exists between states in the international system). Indeed, as will be seen, even the formation of a World-State will not eliminate anarchy. In this paper I will identify and discuss four major categories of anarchy, determined in large part by the structure of the power and authority relationships within them: Natural Anarchy (NA), Hobbesian-State Anarchy (HSA), World-State Anarchy (WSA), and Constitutional Anarchy (CA). In light of this, the fundamental issue ceases to

1 “Again, men having no pleasure, but on the contrary a great deal of grief, in keeping company where there is no power able to over-awe them all.” & “Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war, and such a war as is of every man against every man.” (Hobbes, Leviathan, Ch. xiii, sections 5 & 8, pp. 75 & 76)

“The final cause, end, or design of men (who naturally love liberty and dominion over others) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves in which we see them live in commonwealths is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of war, which is necessarily consequent (as hath been shown [ch. xiii]) to the natural passions of men, when there is no visible power to keep them in awe, and tie them by fear of punishment to the performance of their covenants and observation of those laws of nature set down in the fourteenth and fifteenth chapters.” (Hobbes, Leviathan, Ch. xvii, section 1, p. 106); see also, Locke's Second Treatise on Government, Chapters 8 & 9, especially sections 95, 124-126, pp. 309-310 & 325.
be whether the state or anarchy is to be preferred, but rather becomes which type of
anarchy is to be preferred.

The Persistence of Anarchy

It will first be necessary to define this vague word: anarchy. The definition given
by Hobbes seem to be the most common: anarchy “signifies want of government.”² This
definition seems adequate at first glance, but notice that it depends on how one defines
government. Government, however, is generally associated with order and the rule of
law; hence, the popular identification of anarchy with chaos, lawlessness and disorder, a
common misconception eagerly encouraged by supporters of the state. In fact, as will be
shown, there are powerful theoretical and historical reasons for holding the reverse, viz.,
that the state is the prime source of disorder in society and social order can be brought
about and maintained by a combination of informal order, voluntary law, and a
polycentric coercive legal system. All of the alleged functions of the state have at one
time or another been provided by society and the market via other means, and there are
theoretical arguments and historical evidence for why this is preferable. It will not do,
then, simply to define government so as to equate it with order and the rule of law, and
anarchy as lack of government and therefore chaos, lawlessness and disorder. This is
precisely what is at issue. More neutral and precise definitions are required.

The State, or government, is most accurately defined as an organization that
claims a territorial monopoly on the legal use of force and ultimate decision-making. This
definition is neutral with respect to justice, order, and the rule of law. For the same

² Hobbes, Ch. xix, section 2, p. 119.
reasons, I think anarchy is best defined as the lack of a monopolistic common authority for the provision of security, determination of the law, adjudication of conflicting claims, and securing of compliance. To be more precise, a relationship between persons A and B is anarchic if it lacks a monopolistic common authority that purports to provide them with security, determine the law, adjudicate their disputes, and secure their compliance with its decisions.\(^3\)\(^4\) This definition of anarchy is consistent with social contract theorist visions of the state of nature and the origin and purpose of government.\(^5\) In applying this conception of anarchy, however, it becomes apparent that it is not only state-less societies that are anarchic. Anarchy is a pervasive and persistent phenomenon whether one considers natural anarchy, the division of humanity among a multitude of states, a universal state, or even the internal structure of states themselves (e.g., when power is divided among several branches as in the United States).\(^6\)

Diagram 1:
Natural Anarchy

A--------anarchic--------B

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\(^4\) It is important to note that this definition and the analysis that follows do not in any way depend on an Enlightenment notion of reason or man as an 'atomistic individual'; quite the contrary, the author recognizes the deeply social nature of man, but also recognizes that there is no such thing as society except insofar as it is comprised of individuals and their mutual relations and traditions and that whatever the source of their reasons it is only individuals who choose and act (that we can only speak of society acting by way of shorthand). The definition and analysis do not ignore or contradict the social nature of man or his cultural diversity but rather operate on a level of theoretical generality that makes them universally applicable to the understanding of diverse particulars.

\(^5\) See note 1.

\(^6\) The argument that follows in this section is heavily indebted to the essay by James Ostrowski (cited in note 3) and Alfred Cuzan's “Do We Ever Really Get Out of Anarchy?” *Journal of Libertarian Studies*, 3 (2), pp. 151-8, <http://www.mises.org/journals/jls/3_2/3_2_3.pdf>.
I use the term natural anarchy to mean a stateless society for several reasons, some of which will become more apparent later. One reason is that it serves as a baseline or starting point for analysis, from which we can introduce first one state and then a second. In the next section I will distinguish sharply between natural anarchy and the traditional concept of the state of nature, but for present purposes I will treat them as synonymous.

Let us consider, first, the condition of a single state-dominated society in comparison with the condition of natural anarchy. In natural anarchy the relationship between any given pair of individuals is anarchic because they do not have a single common authority to which they can, and indeed, must, turn. The same reasoning applies to larger groups of persons as to dyads. The formation of a state, however this actually occurs in the real world, provides the inhabitants of a given area with just such a single common authority. The institutions of the state then, according to social contract theory, establish a known set of laws, protect its subjects from each other as well as external threats, adjudicate disputes between them and secure compliance with its decisions. The relationships between a state's subjects qua subjects thus appear to be transformed into non-anarchic relationships.

What is almost universally overlooked is that the relationship between the state and its subjects, i.e., between ruler and ruled, remains anarchic. Ultimately there is no third party, no common authority, to which to turn in a dispute with the state itself. Though it remains anarchic, the relationship between the state and its subjects takes on a

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7 Introducing more states would provide unnecessary and cumbersome complication to the analysis in this essay without changing the essential insights gained from considering a two-state system.

8 As in no one, or monopolistic, common authority – not zero common authorities.
hegemonic character that is absent in the relationship between A and B in a condition of natural anarchy. This is due to the predominance of power in the hands of the state and its prolonged influence over the people of a given area as well as the air of legitimate authority claimed by the state. A band of highwaymen in natural anarchy may have a disproportionately greater power than their victims, but such exercise of power lacks a hegemonic character.\(^9\)\(^,\)\(^10\)

Now, obviously this picture is complicated by states with a high degree of structural complexity. The matter is more clearcut when there is a single supreme ruler controlling the reigns of the state. Even when multiple levels and branches of government, and large bureaucracies, are introduced into consideration, however, the conclusion in the final analysis remains the same. On any given issue either there is a final arbiter within the state or there is not; if there is, then the relationship between the subject and that person or group of persons (and his/their agents) is anarchic, and, if there is not, then even the claim that states transform the relationships between their own subjects from anarchic to non-anarchic would appear to be illusory as well.\(^11\)

One might well object that with the separation of powers on the American model, an individual in a dispute with the executive branch could turn to the judicial branch, namely the Supreme Court, as their common authority on constitutional matters; but what

\(^9\) Rothbard (2004) in *MES* seems to use the term hegemonic for any non-voluntary exchange regardless of the length or durability of the relationship, but this use of the term appears to me to be idiosyncratic.

\(^10\) Should such a mobile band of robbers decide to settle down and give up their one-shot robberies in favor of a more prolonged expropriation of wealth from the people of a given area, then what we have is the robber band transforming itself into a state and, thus, a departure from the conditions of natural anarchy.

\(^11\) One complaint made about a polycentric legal system in natural anarchy is that in it there would be no absolutely final arbiter, but the separation of powers doctrine seems not to avoid this alleged problem either.
if an individual's dispute is with the Supreme Court itself? To whom does he then turn? And if one could move from one branch of government to the next endlessly jockeying for his preferred outcome, what then has been gained by accepting the state over natural anarchy? In the end, however, the state is a single organization that claims a territorial monopoly, thus prohibiting in any dispute between state officials and its subjects recourse to unapproved third parties or an overarching common authority beyond the state itself.

Social contract theorists like Hobbes and Locke, especially Hobbes, might well object that the social contract forms the people into a corporate body and that one cannot therefore speak of the relationship between subject and ruler as anarchic any more than one could of an anarchic relationship between the human body and its head. This objection strikes me as legalistic, however. For legal purposes, that is, in terms of status before the law, a corporation formed by a group of individuals can be treated as a single entity but this in no way abolishes the separateness and individuality of the persons that make up the group as if they were somehow mystically transmogrified into a single organism. Indeed, the analogy of society or the state with that of a biological organism dates back at least to Aristotle and has been dangerously misleading ever since, serving as a justification for all manner of collectivist and totalitarian horrors.

When we consider a system with at least two states, yet more anarchic relationships reveal themselves. The most obvious is the least disputed and most recognized type of anarchic relationship, that of the relationship between sovereign states in the international system. Indeed, this type of anarchy was explicitly cited by Hobbes as

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12 If this is the case, that there is no final arbiter or supreme authority within the state, as in Constitutional Anarchy within HSA and WSA (see below), then it would seem that even the relationship between the subjects of a state may be anarchic as well. There is no single common authority for them to turn to but rather three competing authorities.
one of the chief inspirations (along with the condition of war) for his conception of the state of nature. In the absence of a world government, states have no single common authority to turn to and, it is argued, must therefore resort to self-help. As will be shown below, however, a failure to fully understand the nature of the state has led to the questionable yet largely unquestioned assumption that the conditions under natural anarchy must necessarily be the same (if not worse) than the conditions of international anarchy.

In addition to international anarchy, we can identify at least two other types of anarchic relationships in such a system: 1) that between individual states and the subjects of other states and 2) that between the subjects of different states. Again, social contract theorists like Hobbes and Locke, especially Hobbes, might object that these two types of anarchy do not obtain because the jurisdiction of states is territorially defined and foreign subjects can be assumed to have consented (at least tacitly or implicitly) to the authority of the state in whose territory they currently find themselves. Rousseau has a slightly different objection: “Finally, each State can have only other States, and not men, as enemies, since no true relationship can be established between things of differing natures.” These objections do not work, however, because the argument for the relationship between a state and its subjects being anarchic is equally applicable here, if not more so. The state is a group of men; only the absurd notion of the state as a mystical corporate entity could lend support to these objections. And the fact that the exercise of

13 Hobbes, Ch. xiii, sections 9 & 12, pages 76 & 78. Even in international anarchy, and often in war, however, moral and cultural norms and institutions are present and operative; see, e.g., Wendt (1992, 1999) and Wendt and Friedheim (1995).
14 Rousseau (1978), p. 50
power and authority by states over foreign subjects has often been a source of interstate conflict in the world also speaks against these objections.

It is useful to group all of the types of anarchy thus far considered (with the exception of natural anarchy, which can be considered a category of its own) under a single category, and pertinent because they result from the formation of one or more states as per traditional social contract theory. For lack of a better term, it seems appropriate to name this category after the first social contract theorist: Hobbesian-State Anarchy. This moniker will come to appear all the more appropriate later in the essay when the major categories of anarchy are compared. Below is a graphic illustration of Hobbesian-State Anarchy (HSA), simplified to a two-state system for ease of illustration. S1 and S2 represent the two states. A and B represent subjects of S1, while C and D represent subjects of S2. The anarchic relationships between B and C, S1 and C, and S2 and B, though not so illustrated, can generalized to A and D as well.
It might be thought that HSA can be escaped by the formation of a single world government, and indeed this is a sometimes proposed solution to the problem of international anarchy, but what obtains is really only another category of anarchy that mirrors the situation of a state and its subjects but on a much larger and more complex scale. A single world government would indeed seem to escape the problem of international anarchy, but it would also have the effect of transforming HSA into World-State Anarchy (WSA)\textsuperscript{15} in much the same way that the formation of a state appears to transform the relationships between its subjects from anarchic to non-anarchic but retains an anarchic relationship between itself and its subjects. WSA can be illustrated thusly:

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
    \node at (0,0) {S1};
    \node at (2,0) {S2};
    \node at (1,1.732) {WS};
    \draw (0,0) -- (2,0);
    \draw (0,0) -- (1,1.732);
    \draw (2,0) -- (1,1.732);
    \node at (1,0) {non-anarchic};
    \node at (0.5,0.866) {anarchic};
    \node at (1.5,0.866) {anarchic};
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{15} My inner nerd leads me to prefer the term Universal-State Anarchy (USA; no pun intended!), because future technological and entrepreneurial advances and the colonization of space would make the term “World-State Anarchy” incorrect and misleading as a moniker for the most universal state then possible, but for present purposes the two terms are nearly synonymous.
The above illustration assumes a federative world-state, but the same analysis holds and the same diagram can be used for a unitary world-state, simply by replacing S1 with subject A and S2 with subject B. An anarchic relationship still obtains between S1 (or S2), or A (or B), and the officials of the world-state.

There remains at least one more category of anarchy to consider. Constitutional Anarchy might be thought of as a kind of second-order category of anarchy because it exists within or depends upon the other three categories already discussed. Depending on which other category of anarchy one is considering it within, and depending on how one defines the state and subject and other relevant terms, the nature of Constitutional Anarchy will change. For example, even when there is a single supreme ruler, not only is the relationship between him and his common subjects anarchic but so too is the relationship between him and his agents. This is true whether one considers the agents to rank among the supreme ruler's subjects and the ruler himself to be identical to the state, or whether one considers the agents to be state officials but not subjects. In either case, the relationship is anarchic, though in the former the anarchic relationship is considered to be between the state and its (his) subjects and in the latter the relationship exists within the state itself.

The principle of separation of powers and checks and balances on the model of the United States' Constitution, part of the reason for calling the United States at the time of its founding a constitutionally-limited republic, also serves to create a type of anarchy within states. Constitutional Anarchy within HSA or WSA modeled after the American three branches of government can be illustrated thusly:
Since the authority and power of the state is divided between three co-equal (or not) branches of government and none of them is given supreme authority over the others, the relationship between each branch (or the officials of each branch) is anarchic. They have no common authority to appeal to in order to protect themselves from each other and resolve disputes in an enforceable manner.

It might be objected that the people are truly sovereign and the final arbiters but this is a quaintly idealistic notion that ignores what has been called the 'iron law of oligarchy' and the relative degree of autonomy that state officials have from the people they rule. It is true, as David Hume and, some two hundred years before him, Étienne de la Boétie, recognized that all governments rest in some sense upon general popular acceptance, even the worst tyrannies; but this sort of acceptance can as easily be the result of apathy or fear as the power of the people over their rulers, and is probably more
often the former than the latter. At best, public opinion serves to constrain the policy choices of state officials rather than to control them absolutely. Moreover, this objection proves too much, for if the people are the sovereigns and the final arbiters in a state-dominated society, the same would seem to be the case in a stateless one. Additionally, the argument of this objection is circular, for the state is posited as the common authority over the people while the people are posited as the common authority over the three branches of government that comprise the state. Finally, the objection is problematic because the common authority needs to be an individual or organization that can perform the functions normally ascribed to the state, and 'the people' is no such individual or organization, otherwise it again proves too much, for it would apply equally to state-dominated and stateless societies.

It also seems that Constitutional Anarchy within HSA and WSA negates the transformative effect of the state on the relationships between its subjects. In other words, it appears that the transformation of the anarchic relationship between subjects A and B into a non-anarchic relationship can only occur if the state has a highly centralized structure with a single supreme ruler. Dividing state power among several branches of government has the effect of creating an anarchic relationship between them, and if the subjects can move from one branch to the other in an endless jockeying for their preferred outcome, since none of the branches is the absolutely final arbiter, then there would seem to be no single common authority to whom the subjects can turn. Anarchy would then seem to be all-pervasive.

\[16\] See the passages cited note 1.
It may seem paradoxical but Constitutional Anarchy can be a feature of Natural Anarchy as well as Hobbesian-State Anarchy and World-State Anarchy; that is, natural anarchy can be, but need not be, constitutional. Certainly natural anarchy can devolve into lawlessness, disorder, chaos, and rampant violence. But it need not do so. It is at least conceivable that natural anarchy can enjoy a constitutional structure – meaning not merely a paper document but actual structures, institutions, and incentives – in the form of informal order produced by moral and cultural institutions, voluntary law (like the medieval Law Merchant), and a polycentric coercive legal system. Polycentric here means a legal system comprised of multiple institutions and organizations with competing and overlapping jurisdictions, as opposed to a monocentric system in which a single monopolistic organization has jurisdiction in a given geographic or issue area. Indeed, as will be argued further below, Constitutional Anarchy within HSA and WSA merely simulates market competition within a fundamentally monopolistic context while Constitutional Natural Anarchy is a radically decentralized manifestation of the principle of separation of powers and checks and balances that can take full advantage of unhampered market forces. On the other hand, it is important to point out that while natural anarchy can have a constitutional structure, it need not be a libertarian one. It is conceivable that such a society could have cultural values and laws inconsistent with and even contrary to what is demanded by libertarianism (or some other belief system); but again, while this is possible it need not necessarily be so.
Natural Anarchy vs. The State of Nature

The state of nature is a fiction, and an unrealistic one at that. Natural anarchy, by contrast, is a plausible possibility. The difference between the two is no better illustrated than by turning to Hobbes:

Whatsoever is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man, the same is consequent to the time wherein men live without other security than what their own strength and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain, and consequently, no culture of the earth, no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea, no commodious building, no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force, no knowledge of the face of the earth, no account of time, no arts, no letters, no society, and which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.\(^\text{17}\)

The social contract and the state and society formed thereby are necessary to bring man out of this condition; or, more realistically, since Hobbes admits no such state of nature has ever existed,\(^\text{18}\) this is the condition man would be in without the state. But theory and history show that neither position is correct. Man in the state of nature, then, is an atomistic individual possessing only his own physical abilities and an instrumental rationality. There is no society and, thus, it would appear no culture and no morality either until the making of the social contract.

If anything, Rousseau's conception of the state of nature is even less realistic than that of Hobbes. On this conception, man is an isolated and solitary, passive, pacifistic, and pre-rational being who maintains a primitive, property-less existence.\(^\text{19}\) Rousseau actually seems to offer his state of nature as a historical event, but we know from

\(^{17}\) Hobbes, Ch. xiii, section 9, p. 76. Emphasis mine.
\(^{18}\) Hobbes, Ch. xiii, section 12, p. 78.
\(^{19}\) Rousseau (1964), *Second Discourse*, p. 137.
anthropological and ethnographic evidence that man has always lived a social existence and, by and large, a propertied (in some form) and warlike one as well.\textsuperscript{20} Even if one allows for the account as an evolutionary beginning for man – man's condition before he evolved to become man as we know him – the story does not hold up to scrutiny, for zoological evidence reveals that primitive animals and man's nearest biological cousins are territorial and warlike as well.

[Locke and Montesquieu; Spinoza?]

In the following section, I will critique the social contract in part because of its grounding in conceptions of a state of nature. In my comparative analysis of anarchy, however, I will be juxtaposing natural anarchy with Hobbesian-State Anarchy and World-State Anarchy. The reader should keep in mind that, henceforth, natural anarchy and state of nature are not used synonymously. The only assumption I make with regard to natural anarchy is that it lacks a state. Whether natural anarchy necessarily must, probably would, or possibly could lack or include any other feature of state-dominated societies is left up to other theoretical considerations and history.

The Emperor Has No Clothes:
Re-evaluating Social Contract Theory and the State

Social Contract Theory's Constructivist Fallacy

Not only does the social contract fail to get us out of anarchy, it fails in a number of other important ways as well. First and foremost, there has never been an actual social contract. The idea of the social contract is an embodiment of the constructivist fallacy. A

\textsuperscript{20} See, for example, Hayek (1973: 107-108), Ghiglieri (2000), Guilaine and Zammit (2005), Keeley (1996), and Otterbein (2004).
groundless theory is confused with reality and used as the justification for the state. No state in the world has ever been formed by a social contract, not even the United States. Neither peoples nor their self-proclaimed leaders come together to fabricate a society, cultural norms, and a state out of whole cloth. Civilizations – societies and their cultures, institutions, and organizations – rather develop through slow social evolution: through the often unintended consequences of individual actions that had different ends in mind, the tinkering with institutions and organizations for whatever reason from within an already existing social context, and so forth. Attempts to engineer society wholesale, as in the French Revolution and twentieth-century attempts at establishing communist societies, invariably and inevitably have disastrous results.

Moreover, Friedrich Hayek has argued that human reason has evolved coeval with civilization. “The conception of an already fully developed mind designing the institutions which made life in society possible is contrary to all we know about the evolution of man.”

The cultural heritage into which man is born consists of a complex of practices or rules of conduct which have prevailed because they made a group of men successful but which were not adopted because it was known that they would bring about desired effects. Man acted before he thought and did not understand before he acted.  

Man is as much a rule-following animal as a purpose-seeking animal. And he is successful not because he knows why he ought to observe the rules which he does observe, or is even capable of stating all of these rules in words, but because his thinking and acting are governed by rules which have by a process of selection been evolved in the society in which he lives, and which are thus the product of the experience of generations.  

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22 Ibid., p. 11; Don Lavoie (1982: 21-22) has remarked that “Both Marx and Mises pointed out that rationality as we know it is itself a product of the emergence of market relations.” Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises was something of a mentor to Hayek. Market relations, of course, are far older than the Industrial Revolution and modern capitalism.
Hence, not only is the Hobbesian account of the state of nature unhistorical but it is also
unrealistic, for man is portrayed within it as fully possessing instrumental rationality
without an evolved culture necessary for its existence. Indeed, while many scholars,
Aristotelians and communitarians, have criticized as impoverished the Hobbesian
conception of human nature, it turns out that the Hobbesian conception of human nature
is not impoverished enough! No 'men' in the state of nature would actually be capable of
forming a social contract.

Hayek, and a number of Scottish Enlightenment thinkers such as Adam Ferguson,
David Hume, and Adam Smith, recognized the mechanism of social evolution behind
human reason and culture. Hence, they viewed social contract theories like that of
Hobbes' as a retrogression in social and political science.

This 'rationalist' approach [of Cartesian constructivism], however, meant
in effect a relapse into earlier, anthropomorphic modes of thinking. It
produced a renewed propensity to ascribe the origin of all institutions of
culture to invention or design. Morals, religion and law, language and
writing, money and the market, were thought of as having been
deliberately constructed by somebody, or at least as owing whatever
perfection they possessed to such design. This intentionalist or pragmatic
account of history found its fullest expression in the conception of the
formation of society by a social contract, first in Hobbes and then in
Rousseau, who in many respects was a direct follower of Descartes. Even
though their theory was not always meant as a historical account of what
actually happened, it was always meant to provide a guideline for deciding
whether or not existing institutions were to be approved as rational.23

I see no reason, however, why anyone should accept as a guideline for justification and
approval of existing institutions like government any theory that is so factually
challenged and unhistorical, that sets up a false alternative between government and an

23 Ibid., p. 10.
unrealistic state of nature, and that, at least in the Hobbesian conception, has an impoverished conception of human nature.

The Fallacy of Implicit Consent

Earlier I mentioned almost in passing that there has never been a society or state formed by a social contract, not even the United States. It is not within the scope of this essay to provide a full defense of this claim, although it should be clear from the foregoing that if the social contract refers to the formation of society (as in Rousseau), or the simultaneous formation of the state and society (as in Hobbes), it is plainly false. It might still be thought that the social contract could be salvaged by having it refer exclusively to the formation of a state, but I will now argue that even this maneuver does not work.

The central justificatory concept in social contract theory is consent. For any state to be just, it must have the consent of the governed. Social contract theory attempts to use the concept of consent to explain the origin, purpose, and justification of society and the state. But what does consent mean in this context? Is it the consent of all? Or just of the majority? Or of the strongest party? Can one man or group of men declare consent for another? Must the consent be explicit, or can it be merely assumed? Generally, in social contract theory, consent is merely assumed for all provided certain conditions are met. On this view, consent means implicit or tacit consent. People residing in a given territory can be presumed to have consented to the state that rules over it if said state were something to which a reasonable man would give his consent. Quite naturally there are as
many accounts of what is reasonable as there are social contract theorists: for Hobbes, it is peace, order, and security provided by an absolute sovereign (preferably a monarch); for Locke, it is the protection of the individual's rights to life, liberty, and property by a limited, representative government; for Rawls, it is the socio-economic distribution that the reasonable man would choose from the original position behind a veil of ignorance, namely, a social-welfare state; for Jan Narveson, it is libertarian anarchism. There is something rather suspicious about a seemingly consent-based theory that can accommodate such widely divergent and incompatible conclusions, and in which what turns out to be reasonable is happily in accord with the personal preferences of the theorist or those already in power. This observation is not in itself a refutation of social contract theory, but, since most social contract theories seek to impose hefty positive obligations upon us to society and the state, it at least suggests that the burden of proof is on the social contract theorist.  

It will behoove us, then, to take a hard look at what can or should count as consent. No more exacting an examination of the issue of consent can be found than that of legal theorist and abolitionist Lysander Spooner, writing just after the Civil War, in his “No Treason” essays. Spooner writes that anyone who claims that “his consent is necessary to the establishment or maintenance of government” thereby admits that “every other man’s are equally necessary,” for one man’s rights are just as good as everyone else’s. The opposite is also true: anyone who claims that someone else’s consent is not necessary thereby admits that his own is not necessary either. There is “no alternative but

24 Narveson's contractarian theory is unusual in that it leads to free market anarchism rather than the state, thereby avoiding most (but not all) of the criticisms to follow.

to say, either that the separate, individual consent of every man, *who is required to aid, in any way, in supporting the government*, is necessary, or that the consent of no one is necessary.**26** Given the hefty positive obligations that traditional social contract theories seek to impose on us, it hardly seems enough simply to devise a justificatory theory of the state in which consent is merely assumed provided certain conditions stipulated in the theory are met; surely some sort of actual, demonstrable evidence is needed. But how are we to know if consent has indeed been given? There have been a number of arguments made by social contract theorists as to what counts as evidence of at least implicit consent. Among the most pointed to as evidence are probably voting, paying taxes, and residency. Not a one of these holds up to scrutiny, however.

**Voting:** Even a cursory examination soon reveals that voting and taxation by themselves cannot be taken to demonstrate consent – explicit or implicit. Certainly, even *if* the act of voting were a legitimate demonstration of consent, it “could bind nobody but the actual voters.”**27** It is also not immediately clear that voting for the losing party or candidate demonstrates consent for the state and everything the winner does while in office, nor is it immediately clear that voting for the winner demonstrates consent to all that he does while in office. Suppose I voted for the winning candidate but he breaks all of his campaign promises or enacts policies of which I disapprove and for which he never campaigned.

Furthermore, the act of voting cannot be said to be a demonstration of a person’s consent unless the act of voting were a perfectly voluntary one. Yet the act of voting

**26** Spooner (1992), p. 60 (emphasis in original).

**27** Ibid., p. 79.
cannot properly be called a perfectly voluntary one for many people (or even for most, or anyone, today). Many may vote out of necessity, out of self-defense, seeing it as the only means they have of preventing the theft of their property or abuse of their rights by other voters. And as “we have no legal knowledge as to who votes from choice, and who from the necessity thus forced upon him, we have no legal knowledge, as to any particular individual, that he voted from choice; or consequently, that by voting, he consented, or pledged himself, to support the government.”

This is so because all voting is done by secret ballot. “No man can reasonably or legally be said to do such a thing as to assent to, or support, the [US] Constitution [or any state], unless he does it openly, and in a way to make himself personally responsible for the acts of his agents, so long as they act within the limits of the power he delegates to them.”

Paying Taxes: On the issue of taxation, no one has put the matter more unequivocally than Lysander Spooner:

It is true that the theory of our Constitution is, that all taxes are paid voluntarily; that our government is a mutual insurance company, voluntarily entered into by the people with each other; that each man makes a free and purely voluntary contract with all others who are parties to the Constitution, to pay so much money for so much protection, the same as he does with any other insurance company; and that he is just as free not to be protected, and not to pay any tax, as he is to pay a tax, and be protected.

But this theory of our government is wholly different from the practical fact. The fact is that the government, like a highwayman, says to a man: Your money, or your life. And many, if not most, taxes are paid under compulsion of that threat.

The government does not, indeed, waylay a man in a lonely place, spring upon him from the roadside, and, holding a pistol to his head, proceed to

28 Ibid., p. 81 (emphasis in original).
29 Ibid., p. 83.
rifle his pockets. But the robbery is none the less a robbery on that account, and it is far more dastardly and shameful.

The highwayman takes solely upon himself the responsibility, danger, and crime of his own act. He does not pretend that he has any rightful claim to your money, or that he intends to use it for your own benefit. He does not pretend to be anything but a robber. He has not acquired impudence enough to profess to be merely a 'protector', and that he takes men's money against their will, merely to enable him to 'protect' those infatuated travellers, who feel perfectly able to protect themselves, or do not appreciate his peculiar system of protection. He is too sensible a man to make such professions as these. Furthermore, having taken your money, he leaves you, as you wish him to do. He does not persist in following you on the road, against your will; assuming to be your rightful 'sovereign', on account of the 'protection' he affords you. He does not keep 'protecting' you, by commanding you to bow down and serve him; by requiring you to do this, and forbidding you to do that; by robbing you of more money as often as he finds it for his interest or pleasure to do so; and by branding you as a rebel, a traitor, and an enemy to your country, and shooting you down without mercy, if you dispute his authority, or resist his demands. He is too much of a gentleman to be guilty of such impostures, and insults, and villainies as these. In short, he does not, in addition to robbing you, attempt to make you either his dupe or his slave.

The proceedings of these robbers and murderers, who call themselves 'the government', are directly the opposite of these of the single highwayman.30

**Residency:** Mere residence in a territory claimed by a state (or a society through its state) cannot be construed as consent either. The popular retort given dissenters is “If you don't like it, move to another country,” but why should the dissenter necessarily have to leave his property in order to demonstrate his dissent? In other words, on what grounds is his consent presumed unless he demonstrates otherwise by leaving a particular state's claimed jurisdiction? A dissenter may have no better place to go. As Spooner has pointed out: “Suppose it to be the ‘best government on earth’, does that prove its own goodness,

30 Ibid., pp. 84-85 (emphasis in original). The economist Joseph Schumpeter was correct when he wrote that “the theory which construes taxes on the analogy of club dues or of the purchase of services of, say, a doctor only proves how far removed this part of the social sciences is from scientific habits of mind” (Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942), p. 198.). Anyone who doubts this is welcome to experiment with not paying his taxes and see what happens to him.
or only the badness of all other governments?” Or mayhaps he does not want to leave his family and friends, and perhaps have to learn a new language and/or new job skills to be able to function in this new country to which he finds himself forced to migrate. The notion that residence demonstrates consent actually rests on a hidden and unargued for premise, viz., that society or the state has a prior claim to all the land, property, and individuals in a given geographic area. I find no justification for this premise in social contract theory itself and, indeed, none could be given without transforming social contract theory into some other sort of justificatory theory of the state; the justification of the state would no longer rest in the consent granted in the social contract.

Spooner trenchantly concludes:

The ostensible supporters of the Constitution, like the ostensible supporters of most other governments, are made up of three classes, viz.: 1. Knaves, a numerous and active class, who see in the government an instrument which they can use for their own aggrandizement or wealth. 2. Dupes – a large class, no doubt – each of whom, because he is allowed one voice out of millions in deciding what he may do with his own person and his own property, and because he is permitted to have the same voice in robbing, enslaving, and murdering others, that others have in robbing, enslaving, and murdering himself, is stupid enough to imagine that he is a “free man,” a “sovereign”; that this is “a free government”; “a government of equal rights,” “the best government on earth,” and such like absurdities. 3. A class who have some appreciation of the evils of government, but either do not see how to get rid of them, or do not choose to so far sacrifice their private interests as to give themselves seriously and earnestly to the work of making a change.

If implicit consent and its proxies – voting, paying taxes, and residency – do not suffice as demonstrations of consent within social contract theory, is there then nothing that might? A good first cut at the problem is the explicit consent of each and every

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31 Ibid., p. 122n. 2.
32 Ibid., p. 84. Spooner's critique of the US Constitution is far more extensive and thorough than has been alluded to here.
competent adult.\textsuperscript{33} It bears pointing out that only agreements that garner the explicit and unanimous consent of all parties involved can justifiably be called contracts,\textsuperscript{34} which is yet another reason why there has never been a social contract; the social 'contract' is no agreement between consenting parties but rather a theory of popular subjection mountebanking the unwary by masquerading as a theory of popular sovereignty. Even explicit and unanimous consent proves problematic by itself, however. A broader ethical and political framework is required, and a political principle more fundamental than consent. Otherwise, it would seem that just anything that garners explicit and unanimous consent will be justified, but this appears to be arbitrary.

\textit{An Aristotelian Natural Rights Critique of the State}

The broader ethical political framework I have in mind is an Aristotelian liberal one.\textsuperscript{35} And the political principle more fundamental than consent is the natural, individual right to liberty understood within a \textit{eudaimonistic} theory of human flourishing. More to

\textsuperscript{33} Competent here meaning a human being with normal biological functioning. Exceptions could include childhood, severe mental retardation, or severe (and actual) insanity, in which an individual’s faculty of reason is considered to be in an impaired, disabled, or not fully developed state.

\textsuperscript{34} I would stipulate further that valid contracts involve transfer of property titles, as per the “title transfer” theory of contracts. On a different note, I have heard that Walter Grinder once said: “An implicit contract is not worth the paper it is not written on” (unknown source). On yet another different but related note, if Jan Narveson’s Hobbesian-influenced contractarian theory is properly to be called contractarian, the contract in contractarian must only refer to actual, explicit and valid contracts formed for the exchange of goods and services, and not to the formation of society and cultural (including moral and political) norms.

the point, I intend to bring this Aristotelian natural rights approach to bear in a critique of
the state.

In the liberal tradition rights have, at least since Locke, generally been grounded
in self-ownership, and liberalism has generally been viewed by defenders and critics alike
as having little or nothing to say about ethical issues beyond justice. An Aristotelian
liberalism, on the other hand, grounds rights precisely in man's obligation to pursue
eudaimonia, his natural and ultimate end, which is a life of flourishing or well-being, a
life proper to man. Since man is a rational, political and social being, a fully human life is
one lived in accord with these essential aspects of his nature within the context that he is
neither a god nor a mere beast but a human being who must make his way in the world in
all his vulnerable embodiedness without giving in to the baser aspects of his nature.

First and foremost, eudaimonia requires living a life of reason, which means using
one's rational faculty to discover the ends one ought to pursue and the proper means for
achieving them, both in solitary situations and in social and political life. The virtues are
constitutive of a life of eudaimonia, principles of proper conduct both for when we are
alone and in our relations with others. Like the virtue ethics of Aristotle, Aristotelian-
liberal virtue ethics focuses on the moral agent; it offers a supply-side approach rather
than a typically modern demand-side approach to morality and rights. As Roderick Long
(1994/95) explains: “According to a demand-side ethics, the way that A should treat B is
determined primarily by facts about B, the patient of moral activity; but for a supply-side
approach like Virtue Ethics, the way that A should treat B is determined primarily by
facts about A, the agent of moral activity.” 36 The central question of a eudaimonistic

virtue ethics is not “What consequences should I promote?” or “What rules should I follow?” but rather “What kind of person should I be?”

It is the very nature of eudaimonia and virtue, or more narrowly of moral acts, that they must be desired and freely chosen for the right reasons. The pursuit of eudaimonia, the practice of virtue, must be self-directed. Coercive interference, or the threat or use of initiatory force, compromises self-direction and therefore moral agency. An act of mine does not count as virtuous and therefore contributory toward my eudaimonia if you force it upon me, even if it otherwise would have been had I desired and freely chosen it for the right reasons. From the structural level of analysis, of the ordering principle of society, we can see that the right to liberty protects the possibility of self-direction, a necessary condition for moral agency common to all forms of human flourishing. The right to liberty, in this sense, is a metanormative principle. This is essentially the argument made by Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl. While I think this argument is correct and certainly important, from the point of view of virtue ethics this point that the right to liberty is a metanormative principle is not the whole story or even the most important part, and certainly not the most fundamental part.

David Gordon points out one deficiency of a primarily demand-side defense of rights, like that of Rasmussen and Den Uyl: “[I]t does not follow from the fact that others must respect your rights, if you are to flourish, that you have an obligation to respect their rights. You may well have such an obligation, but more than an appeal to the conditions of your own flourishing is needed to show this.” Arguing that the right to liberty is

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37 See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, II.4 (1105a18-1105b17) and III.1-5 (1109b30-1115a6).
necessary for protecting the possibility of everyone's flourishing goes some distance in shoring up this deficiency, but it still seems too consequentialist, not quite Aristotelian enough. Why should I not violate your liberty for my own benefit, or the benefit of others, if I think I have a reasonable chance of getting away with it (with or without doing irreparable harm to societal order)? To answer this, we need an account of rights as interpersonal ethical principles the respecting of which is constitutive of all forms of flourishing worthy of the name.

From the personal level of analysis, the level of ethical theory, we can draw on the supply side-demand side distinction to arrive at the realization that rights do not derive primarily from facts about the rights-bearer qua moral patient but rather derive primarily from facts about the moral agent. In other words, it is not that rights are first properties of individuals and thereby produce obligations in others. On the contrary, it is rather our prior obligations as human beings to live a life of reason from which rights are derived. As Long argues,

just as courage, generosity, and temperance are the virtues that define the appropriately human attitudes toward danger, giving, and bodily pleasures respectively, so the virtue of justice defines the appropriately human attitude toward violence. A maximally human life will give central place to the distinctively human faculty of reason; and one's life more fully expresses this faculty to the extent that one deals with others through reason and persuasion, rather than through violence and force. To choose cooperation over violence is to choose a human mode of existence over a bestial one. Hence the virtuous person will refrain from initiating coercion against others.39

[Revise and expand.]

For Locke, the origin and purpose of government, and its only justification, is the protection of the individual's rights to life, liberty, and property. If the state is to have any justification in light of a Lockean or Aristotelian liberalism, it will at least have to meet this criterion. A careful examination of the nature of the state, however, reveals that it cannot. Recall that the state is an organization that claims a territorial monopoly on the legal use of force and ultimate decision-making. Consider, also, that states generally acquire their revenue by physical coercion (taxation). Now, taxation is theft and therefore a violation of property rights. While it is conceivable that in principle a state could acquire its revenue purely from voluntary contributions, it would be a misnomer to call this taxation. If tax 'contributions' were truly voluntary, there would be no need to back up their collection with the threat or use of force. As a self-proclaimed territorial monopolist, even the most minimal libertarian state, should it seek to enforce its claim, must necessarily violate the rights of any of its rights-respecting subjects who prefer an alternative. When the state attempts to prohibit competitors in the voluntary production, purchase and sale of defense and legal services, it violates the rights of all the parties involved. Even if we put all this aside, no state known to history has been so constituted as to provide a reasonable assurance that the exercise of its power will not be arbitrary, that the laws it passes will be just, that it will not seek continually and increasingly to expand the size and scope of its activities beyond the protection of rights.

It would be correct to point out that none of the foregoing precludes the possibility of a state actually acquiring the explicit and unanimous consent of its subjects. One possible means of voluntary revenue for the state that has been suggested is a lottery. However, one wonders how any state would effectively enforce its claim to a territorial monopoly with voluntary contributions as its only source of revenue. Hence, one sees in history the inherent tendency of states to impose and increase taxation on their subjects.
It is, after all, conceivable that a state could, at least in principle, manage to do so. A few points can be made in reply. First, while this may in principle be possible, in actual practice such an occurrence is exceedingly unlikely and like to be of only transitory duration. Second, this in-principle-possibility is no justification of a state that does not have explicit and unanimous consent in reality. Third, as I mentioned above, although consent is necessary, it is not enough to justify the state, to make the state just. A state that has the explicit and unanimous consent of its subjects but violates the rights of other persons who are not its subjects is still unjust, as are its agents and supporters.

More to the point, a contract with the state is no more valid than, and is essentially the same as, a slavery contract. This is essentially because the state claims a territorial monopoly on the legal use of force and ultimate decision-making. In both cases (of state contracts and slavery contracts), to paraphrase Spooner, an individual delegates, or gives to another, a right of arbitrary dominion over himself, and this no one can do, for the right to liberty is inalienable. If the subject/slave later changes his mind, exit from the agreement would be barred to him by the terms of the contract; a state contract with the right of secession (down to the individual level), or a slavery contract with the right of exit, would be a contradiction in terms. Moreover, even if the contract stipulates what the state/master can or cannot do to the subject/slave, aside from those stipulations the

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41 Henceforth, for lack of a better term, I will use “state contract” to refer to such explicit contracts with the state (in contradistinction with the implicit consent-based social 'contract'.)  
42 Locke's contention that the people have a right to revolution because the relationship between a people and their state is contractual notwithstanding; that this ought to be the case is true. Moreover, a truly voluntary government will recognize an unlimited right of secession (making revolution unnecessary). But it is the argument of this and the previous section that Locke's normative claim about states does not reflect reality – states do not behave as if their relationships with their people are contractual, and no such contract has ever been signed by all of the people in any case. Furthermore, it is not enough for the rights to secession and revolution to reside only in the people as a whole.
state/master has been delegated or given arbitrary dominion over the subjectslave. If anything, the state contract is the worse of the two because states generally have greater power and perceived legitimacy than individual persons and private organizations. To whom does the subject turn when the state begins exceeding the limits of the contract?

For an explanation of why the right to liberty is inalienable, and why one cannot therefore delegate or give to another a right of arbitrary dominion over himself, two points can be made, the first suggestive and the second decisive. First, since we all have an obligation to live a life of eudaimonia, which requires self-directed action, person A cannot morally abdicate his responsibility by delegating or giving to person B a right of arbitrary dominion over himself. While this claim does not by itself establish the right to liberty or its inalienability, it does point out the moral impropriety on the part of the would-be subjectslave to enter into a state or slavery contract. Second, recall that for Aristotelian liberalism rights derive primarily from the moral agent's obligation not to initiate aggression against other rational beings. Rights do not simply reside in the moral patient and thereby produce obligations for others. Person A's right not to be aggressed against by person B cannot simply be abdicated by an act of will to B, for B's obligation not to aggress against A depends on B's calling as a human being, something which is not in the control of A. The right to liberty is therefore inalienable. It follows from this that both state contracts and slavery contracts are illegitimate because they are fraudulent on the part of the would-be subjectslave and more generally unjust on the part of the would-be state/master, for the former is attempting to transfer something that is not his to

43 The argument that follows is heavily indebted to Roderick Long's (1994/95) “Slavery Contracts and Inalienable Rights: A Formulation.”
transfer and the latter is attempting to receive and exercise a power to which he has no
right. The state, therefore, can never be just, even in the extremely unlikely event it
should somehow garner the explicit and unanimous consent of its subjects.\textsuperscript{44,45} That the
state is inherently unjust is a conceptual truth, whether any given organization in society
counts as a state is a separate empirical matter that must be left up to analysis of history
and the present. I dare say, however, that every one of the national governments currently
existing is a state.

\textit{A Lockean Argument Against Locke: The Non Sequitur of the Social Contract}\textsuperscript{46}

According to Locke, all men are created by God, born equally free in a state of
nature. Man, born with a God-given

title to perfect freedom and an uncontrolled enjoyment of all the rights and
privileges of the Law of Nature, equally with any other man, or number of
men in the world, hath by nature a power not only to preserve his property
– that is, his life, liberty, and estate, against the injuries and attempts of
other men, but to judge of and punish the breaches of that law in others, as
he is persuaded the offence deserves…each being, where there is no other,
judge for himself and executioner… .\textsuperscript{47}

Locke argues that men will find it rational to voluntarily give up this equality of authority
by setting up a government to protect their rights because these rights are imperfectly
secure in a state of nature. Locke identifies “three principal defects” of the state of nature

\textsuperscript{44} This is not to say that everything a state may do or require of us is unjust.
\textsuperscript{45} If the foregoing has raised the worry that the Aristotelian liberal account of rights undermines the
making of contracts in general, it is beyond the scope of this essay to allay those concerns but I happily
refer the reader to Long (1994/95) wherein this worry has already deftly been dealt with. It also bears
pointing out that a similar critique of the state can be made on purely Lockean grounds, although
Locke’s conception of the inalienability of the right to liberty hinges upon God’s ownership of us rather
than on a supply-side justice argument.
\textsuperscript{46} Much of the following discussion was inspired by Roderick Long’s (1994a) “The Nature of Law: Part
II” in which first I encountered this argument.
\textsuperscript{47} Locke, VII.87, p. 304.
as the reasons for this insecurity. Philosopher Roderick Long has insightfully labeled them the legislative defect, judicial defect, and executive defect, respectively.

Firstly, there wants an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the common measure to decide all controversies between them. For though the Law of Nature be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures, yet men, being biased by their interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding them in the application of it to their particular cases.

Secondly, in the State of Nature there wants a known and indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the established law. For every one in that state being both judge and executioner of the Law of Nature, men being partial to themselves, passion and revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too much heat in their own cases, as well as negligence and unconcernedness, make them too remiss in other men's.

Thirdly, in the State of Nature there often wants power to back and support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution. They who by any injustice offended will seldom fail where they are able by force to make good their injustice. Such resistance many times makes the punishment dangerous, and frequently destructive to those who attempt it.

“Locke concludes that these three defects may be remedied by centralizing the legislative, judicial, and executive functions in a constitutional government” that is restricted to protecting the rights of its citizens. In actuality, however, while these three defects may be applicable to the state of nature, they are more correctly seen as defects of the state than as defects of natural anarchy. Where Locke goes wrong is that he conflates the absence of the state with the absence of law.

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49 Locke, IX.124-126, p. 325.
The Legislative Defect of the State: Locke argues that in the state of nature there “wants an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the common measure to decide all controversies between them.”\textsuperscript{51} Certainly this is desirable and even necessary for societal order. But consider the state, which Robert LeFevre has rightly identified as “a law factory.”\textsuperscript{52} It is the general tendency of the state increasingly to mass produce legislation and/or executive bureaucratic regulations and decrees in proportion with its inevitable growth in power as well as the extent to which legal positivism inevitably supplants natural and customary law in the minds of the state's officials and supporters. Consider the tens of thousands of pages of executive-bureaucratic regulations and legislated laws that the United States government has produced and continues to produce at an increasingly prodigious rate. Executive-bureaucratic regulations are at best only marginally connected to the electoral process as the bureaucrats are unelected officials within the executive branch. For reasons already pointed out, it cannot honestly be said that the average citizen has consented either to executive-bureaucratic regulations and decrees or even to legislative laws. No one can possibly know all of these laws and regulations, due to their immense quantity and the rate with which they are produced. The law is not settled, due to the frequency with which laws and regulations are produced, changed, and repealed. In addition, such laws and regulations tend to be vaguely worded so as to allow numerous arbitrary interpretations, which often gives them the effect of retroactive laws, and there is a great deal of outright contradiction between various laws and regulations.

\textsuperscript{51} Locke, IX.124, p. 325.
\textsuperscript{52} LeFevre (1982 [1959]), p. 31.
The Judicial Defect of the State: Locke argues that the state of nature “wants a known and indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the established law.”\textsuperscript{53} In other words, a third party is wanted as an impartial arbiter since it is undesirable for men, being naturally partial to themselves, to act as judge in their own case. Yet, as has already been noted, as a territorial monopolist the state must necessarily judge in its own case when conflicts arise between itself and its subjects. It is no answer to this charge to reply that with the separation of powers under Constitutionalism the judicial branch can act as an impartial judge in conflicts between subjects and the other two branches. The Supreme Court of the United States, for example, is still a part of the state, and its judges are nominated and appointed by the other two branches; as such it would be naïve to assume that its interests are entirely pure. And, as Roderick Long points out, “What if the citizen’s complaint is with the judicial branch itself?”\textsuperscript{54} The state, therefore, suffers from Locke’s judicial defect.

The Executive Defect of the State: Locke argues that the state of nature “often wants power to back and support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution. They who by any injustice offended will seldom fail where they are able by force to make good their injustice. Such resistance many times makes the punishment dangerous, and frequently destructive to those who attempt it.”\textsuperscript{55} Perhaps in the state of nature individuals will have no recourse to enforcing the law but their solitary selves, but it would be unfair and unrealistic to assume this to be the case under conditions of natural anarchy.

Consider such voluntary systems as the thief-takers’ associations of early nineteenth

\textsuperscript{53} Locke, IX.125, p. 325.  
\textsuperscript{54} Long (1994a).  
\textsuperscript{55} Locke, IX.126, p. 325.
century England or the vigilance committees of the old American frontier or the bohrs of Anglo-Saxon law. Voluntary citizen militias existed in colonial America. The modern private security industry is currently a growth industry. In contrast, a standing police and military are fairly unusual in history; indeed, the former is a relatively modern invention. Whereas market competition will be better able to keep private security and law enforcement in check, a state monopoly on the legal use of force puts individual citizens at the mercy of an overwhelming power prone to corruption, arbitrariness, and general inefficiency.

As a piece of anecdotal evidence, consider the horrific number of people killed by their own governments in the last century. R.J. Rummel, in his seminal book *Death by Government*, painstakingly researched the phenomenon of democide and estimated that governments had killed approximately 169 million of their own subjects from 1900-1987. He has since, on his website, revised this estimate upwards to approximately 262 million deaths for the period 1900-1999. These figures do not include the approximately 38.5 million combat deaths from interstate and intrastate wars during 1900-1987 period. Granted most of the democide has been committed by nondemocratic states, but there is a general tendency for all states to become more tyrannical over time and the combat death statistic includes wars fought by democratic states. Moreover, Rummel's research only reveals the most blatant injustices. We have only to look at the inefficient legal, security and social-welfare services of all states, including democracies, as well as their economic and environmental regulations and trade protectionist measures, that have been the cause

57 See <http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/>.
58 Rummel, p. 3.
of significant but largely uncounted and unmeasurable deaths and other forms of suffering. As Albert Jay Nock has argued, in a fundamental sense the particular form of government of a state is irrelevant:

[U]pon any of the current theories of the State, it is rather remarkable that the right of individual self-expression in politics, which has been rapidly extended and is now wellnigh universal, should have resulted in so much less benefit to the exploited majority than was expected. Republicanism has done little more to make effective the will and the desires of the majority than constitutionalism [in monarchy] and autocracy. [...] But if the State is per se an anti-social institution, an organization of the political means [i.e., “a device to enable certain persons to live without working, by appropriating the labour and labour-products of other persons, without compensation” (229)], then obviously its nature persists under one form as under another, and a change of form or mode counts for nearly nothing. A republic which maintains the integrity of the political means through an army and navy, private monopoly of natural resources, tariffs and franchises, is quite as essentially anti-social as any autocracy that uses the like instruments for that purpose.  

Why is it assumed that the rule of law requires a monocentric legal system? Ronald Hamowy observes: “For at least two hundred years [owing to the Scottish Enlightenment], social philosophers have known that association does not need government, that, indeed, government is destructive of association.”  

Scottish Enlightenment thinkers like Adam Ferguson, David Hume, and Adam Smith as well as modern thinkers like Austrian economist F.A. Hayek have theorized about and described the emergence of society, culture, law, language, and markets as spontaneous orders. In the past century, historians have discovered that the majority of legal systems have been polycentric rather than monocentric, meaning that they had no central or monopolistic authority. Consider the case of early Anglo-Saxon customary law:

59 Nock (1991), pp. 228-229. Hoppe (2002) has argued that representative democracy is actually worse than monarchy, and especially libertarian natural anarchy, for essentially “tragedy of the commons” reasons.

60 Hamowy (2005), pp. 236-237.
A system of surety, known as borh, provided the foundation of Anglo-Saxon law. Under the borh system a set of ten to twelve individuals, defined at first by kinship but later by contractual agreement, would form a group to pledge surety for the good behavior of its members. The group would back up this pledge by paying the fines of its members if they were found guilty of violating customary law. A surety group thus had strong financial incentives to police its members and exclude those who persistently engaged in criminal behavior. Exclusion served as a powerful sanction[].

The Anglo-Saxon courts, called moots, were public assemblies of common men and neighbors. The moots did not expend their efforts on creating or codifying law; they left that to custom and to essentially declaratory law codes of kings [declaratory because kings generally only codified customs already existing in society]. The outcome of a dispute turned entirely on the facts of the case, which were usually established through ritual oath-giving. […]

Anglo-Saxon law had no category for crimes against the state or against society – it recognized only crimes against individuals. As in other customary legal systems, the moots typically demanded that criminals pay restitution or composition to their victims – or else face the hazards of outlawry and blood-feud. […]

Anglo-Saxon law also recognized and respected property rights, to the point that higher penalties were incurred for crimes in or about the home. The moot courts, like the borh, depended on voluntary cooperation.

A favorite example of libertarians is the quasi-anarchistic legal system of Medieval Iceland. In “The Decline and Fall of Private Law in Iceland,” Roderick Long provides a good overview of the Icelandic Free Commonwealth:

In outline, the system's main features were these: Legislative power was vested in the General Assembly (althingi); the legislators were Chieftains (godhar; singular, godhi) representing their Assemblymen (thingmenn; singular, thingmadhr). Every Icelander was attached to a Chieftain, either directly, by being an Assemblyman, or indirectly, by belonging to a

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household headed by an Assemblyman. A Chieftaincy (godhordh) was private property, which could be bought and sold. Representation was determined by choice rather than by place of residence; an Assemblyman could transfer his allegiance (and attendant fees) at will from one Chieftain to another without moving to a new district. Hence competition among Chieftains served to keep them in line.

The General Assembly passed laws, but had no executive authority; law enforcement was up to the individual, with the help of his friends, family, and Chieftain. Disputes were resolved either through private arbitration or through the court system administered by the General Assembly. Wrongdoers were required to pay financial restitution to their victims; those who refused were denied all legal protection in the future (and thus, e.g., could be killed with impunity). The claim to such compensation was itself a marketable commodity; a person too weak to enforce his claim could sell it to someone more powerful. This served to prevent the powerful from preying on the weak. Foreigners were scandalized by this "land without a king"; but Iceland's system appears to have kept the peace at least as well as those of its monarchical neighbors.⁶²

The primary reasons for its decline and fall were 1) the introduction of Christianity, and 2) that it was not private enough, though the system flourished for nearly three hundred years. One of the principal flaws was that the number of chieftaincies were fixed by law and, over time, with the aid of Church tithes (especially the Churchstead fees paid to the private owner of the land each church was built on) as a guaranteed source of income, a relative handful of families were able to buy up a majority of them.

Another prominent example of polycentric law, and one that clearly demonstrates the ability of nonstate legal services to deal with global commerce, is the Law Merchant, "a transnational system of customary law enforced by informal courts,"⁶³ which spontaneously formed in late medieval Europe and "offered a more unified body of law than did the governmental systems with which it competed."⁶⁴ Modern credit bureaus,

⁶² Long (1994b); italics in original. See also, Friedman (1979), Long (2002b), and Whiston (2002).
insurance companies, private arbitration firms, and the like serve similar functions of surety and assurance. Economic theory and the experience of history suggest that, far from being chaotic, polycentric legal systems tended to be voluntary, to converge on a relatively uniform set of law, and were far more adaptable than monocentric systems. We can thus conclude that while the state of nature is defective when it comes to providing defense and legal services and a known law, it is a non sequitur to conclude that the state is necessary for the provision of these things.

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**A Politico-Economic Analysis of the State, HSA, WSA, and CA**

These three defects of the state, and many more, all have their roots in the very nature of the state as a territorial monopolist. It is thought that, if nothing else, the State must have a monopoly over legislation, internal and external defense, and the courts. It is argued that these are “public goods” that the state must control in order to maintain law and order, so that it can protect the rights to life, liberty, and property of its subjects. Yet I have argued that even this “nightwatchman” or “limited government” version of the state possesses an inherent contradiction with regard to this rights-protecting function. The state's nature as a monopoly contradicts more than just its alleged rights-protecting function, however.

As Hoppe, in *The Myth of National Defense*, cleverly puts the matter: It is widely accepted “among political economists and political philosophers” that every “monopoly” is “bad” from the point of view of consumers. Monopoly here is understood in its classical sense as an exclusive privilege granted to a single producer of a commodity or service; i.e., as the absence of “free entry” into a particular line of production. In other words, only one
agency, A, may produce a given good, x. Any such monopolist is “bad” for consumers because, shielded from potential new entrants into his area of production, the price of his product x will be higher and the quality of x lower than otherwise.65

The first economist “to provide a systematic explanation for the failure of governments as security producers” was Gustave de Molinari (1818-1912), in his article “De la Production de la Securité (February 1849)” His argument, which is similar to that of Hoppe’s, is worth quoting at length:

If there is one well-established truth in political economy, it is this:

That in all cases, for all commodities that serve to provide for the tangible or intangible needs of consumers, it is in the consumer’s best interest that labor and trade remain free, because the freedom of labor and trade have as their necessary and permanent result the maximum reduction of price.

And this: That the interests of the consumer of any commodity whatsoever should always prevail over the interests of the producer.

Now in pursuing these principles, one arrives at this rigorous conclusion:

That the production of security should, in the interests of the consumers of this intangible commodity, remain subject to the law of free competition.

Whence it follows: That no government should have the right to prevent another government from going into competition with it, or require consumers of security to come exclusively to it for this commodity…

Either this is logically true, or else the principles on which economic science is based are invalid. (Gustave de Molinari, *Production of Security* [New York: Center for Libertarian Studies, 1977], pp. 3-4)

If, on the contrary, the consumer is not free to buy security wherever he pleases, you forthwith see open up a large profession dedicated to arbitrariness and bad management. Justice becomes slow and costly, the police vexatious, individual liberty is no longer respected, the price of security is abusively inflated and inequitably apportioned, according to the power and influence of this or that class of consumers. (Ibid., pp. 13-14)66

65 Hoppe (2003), pp. 3-4.
66 Quoted in Hoppe (2003), pp. 9-10. Hoppe relates that Molinari was “a prominent Belgian-born French
The principle that all monopolies are bad is clearly incompatible with the proposition that the state must have a territorial monopoly. Ought the first proposition be rejected?

Economic theory and history have shown the classical conception of monopoly to be correct. Is there something special about the production of security, law, and judicial services that exempts them from this principle, making them “public goods” that society and the market cannot provide on a voluntary basis? It might be thought that if society and the market cannot provide these services, then a monopoly, while bad, is the only alternative. But surely the burden of proof must be on those who would answer yes to this public goods question. Molinari has argued that the correct answer is no – society and the market can provide these services. In the aforementioned book edited by Hoppe, Austrian economists and historians offer a compelling case, indeed I would say a decisive case, that Molinari was right and that the “public goods” argument is false. And the discussion above of the three defects of the state provides historical evidence that is only the tip of the proverbial iceberg. If we have no reason to accept the public goods argument and we cannot reject the principle that every monopoly is bad, then we must reject as false the proposition that law and order require an organization that has a territorial monopoly.

It is the very monopolistic nature of the state that enables it to grow beyond any constitutional limitations placed upon it and eventually to transform into Leviathan. To
point out just a few of the problems: The barrier to free entry of competition deprives the state of market incentives to minimize waste, cut costs, and improve the quality of its goods and services. The fact that the state gets its revenue via coercion rather than through sales means that the state is unable to rationally plan and calculate. Without profit-and-loss accounting the state is severely hampered in its ability to know what goods and services to produce, how much to produce, and where they should be distributed; it is unable to determine the most cost-effective way to use the resources at its disposal and has every incentive to just throw more money at a problem. For example, not everyone needs the same kind or amount of security. Moreover, the state has far more incentive than private individuals and organizations to engage in conflict and war, because as a compulsory territorial monopolist it is able to externalize the costs of war (and lesser conflicts) onto its own subjects. Among the means by which it does this are: taxation, inflation, deficit spending, confiscation, price controls, conscription, and the like. As Albert Jay Nock has observed: ““The State claims and exercises the monopoly of crime’ in a given territorial area. ‘It forbids private murder, but itself organizes murder on a colossal scale. It punishes private theft, but itself lays unscrupulous hands on anything it wants, whether the property of citizen or alien.””

As I have remarked previously, a sometimes proposed solution to the problem of international anarchy, and the consequent conflict, war, trade barriers and whatnot that plague it, is the formation of a world government. Indeed, it has been argued by Hoppe that advocates of the state are logically committed to a world state:

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Once it is assumed that, in order to institute peaceful cooperation between A and B, it is necessary to have a state S, a twofold conclusion follows. If more than one state exists—S1, S2, S3—then, just as there can presumably be no peace among A and B without S, so can there be no peace between the states S1, S2, and S3 as long as they remain in a state of nature (i.e., a state of anarchy) with regard to each other. Consequently, in order to achieve universal peace, political centralization, unification, and ultimately the establishment of a single world government are necessary.\(^{70}\)

But would a world state be preferable to several or a great multitude of states? One thing to bear in mind is that a world state would still be a state. It may very well cut down on the number of international conflicts as well as the barriers to trade and the movement of labor. This need not occur, however, especially with regard to the latter, economic issues. Lacking free market competition, and even the competition of other states – its subjects would no longer even be able to 'vote' with their feet! - a world state would have even less incentive than otherwise to serve its subjects well. As in Rome before the fall of the western empire, a world state could very likely strangle the entire world economy. Having jurisdiction over the entire world economy, it could and probably would institute wealth redistribution on a world-wide scale. It would be able to universalize and systematize all of the damaging economic policies that states engage in today, without the incentives to restrain itself that the presence of other states provides. A world state would be able to do everything to its subjects that lesser states can, but with a greater concentration of power, greater economies of scale, and less incentive to restrain itself.

If Hobbesian-State Anarchy and World-State Anarchy do not fair well, theoretically and (in the case of HSA) historically, is it better that the states be designed with constitutional limits such as the separation of powers doctrine, or not? Recall that

the separation of powers doctrine creates an anarchic relationship between the different branches of government. HSA and WSA with Constitutional Anarchy may indeed be better than HSA and WSA without, but it still leaves people being dominated by states. Unfortunately, it has by now become clear that competition within a state, with the separation of powers and checks and balances of Constitutionalism, merely simulates market competition within a fundamentally monopolistic context and therefore does not provide an adequate check on ambition. As Roderick Long has noted with regard to the United States: “There has been a sufficient convergence of interests among the three branches of republican government that, despite occasional squabbles over details, each branch has been complicit with the others in expanding the power of the central government.”

The important comparison is not between HSA and WSA, or HSA or WSA with vs. without CA, but between HSA, WSA, and Natural Anarchy (particularly Constitutional Natural Anarchy).

[More arguments in favor of natural anarchy over HSA and WSA?]

**Conclusion**

I have argued that we can never really get out of anarchy. The formation of several states merely serves to transform Natural Anarchy into Hobbesian-State Anarchy. A sometimes proposed solution to the obvious defects of HSA is the formation of a world government. Indeed, advocates of the state would seem to be logically committed to the ultimate formation of a world state, but this too fails to get us out of anarchy, merely

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transforming HSA into World-State Anarchy. With WSA, however, it seems likely that the cure (WSA) would be far worse than the disease (HSA). The constitutionalist separation of powers doctrine creates yet another type of anarchy, this time within the state apparatus itself.

I have also engaged in a critique of social contract theory and the state. Traditional social contract theory holds that the origin and purpose of government is to escape the state of nature and its perceived deficiencies. The fact that we can never really get out of anarchy serves to undermine the power of social contract theory. After arguing that we can never really get out of anarchy, I made a sharp distinction between natural anarchy and the unrealistic and a-historical state of nature which serves as the foundation for a number of important variants of the social contract theory. I then argued that the very idea of the social contract, whether it refers to society or the state or both, is unrealistic, a-historical, and contrary to both theory and historical evidence. I have found the social contract and the state wanting with respect to consent and justice. Indeed, the social contract is no contract at all. Implicit or tacit consent is inadequate as justification for the state. Voting, paying taxes, and residency do not suffice as evidence for consent – explicit or implicit. I have argued that the state, even a minimal one, is by its very nature unjust. Moreover, I have argued that the three defects – legislative, judicial, and executive – that Locke sees in the fictitious state of nature are actually more applicable to the state than natural anarchy. The state, as a territorial monopolist, suffers from the same problems as do all monopolies.
I have argued that the goods and services it is thought must be provided by the state, can, and have at one time or another in history, be (better) provided voluntarily by society and market. Constitutional natural anarchy, particularly a libertarian one, remains for the most part an untried alternative; but it seems to compare well with Hobbesian-State Anarchy and World-State Anarchy. I do not mean to suggest that I have provided a definitive case in favor of libertarian anarchy, but at the very least my arguments should be suggestive enough to call into doubt the usual way of thinking about the state, anarchy, justice, and social order. Libertarian anarchy largely remains an unknown ideal, but intellectual honesty and a sense of justice demands that it be given serious consideration.

References


