war is the health of the state

Part of my college essays series: This is one of the essays I wrote during the political theory general exam for my PhD. The exam was an approximately 15-hour marathon session, involving 6 out of 12 essay questions, for a final total of 33 double-spaced pages written without access to any notes or sources.

In this essay I will address how the American framers conceived of liberty as well as how the Constitution they designed was supposed to secure it and whether it has in fact done so. Stating my conclusions right out, which I will then seek to explain and justify as best I can in the space and time allotted, I think that though the Constitution was a grand and very admirable attempt at securing liberty it was at the outset doomed to failure in the long run in large part due to inner contradictions and inadequate safeguards.

By and large the framers, and the American people in general, conceived of liberty in Lockean and republican terms. Locke’s influence was particularly prevalent owing largely to the influence of John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon’s Cato’s Letters, which popularized and enhanced the popularity of Lockean individual rights arguments. This is not to neglect the importance of republicanism and of Christianity; the framers in particular were steeped in republicanism, and Christianity was indeed a formative influence on the early Americans, particularly through the thousands of fiery political sermons of the day, many of which also employed Lockean rights language (such as Elisha Williams in particular, but also Jonathan Mayhew and John Allen).

However, liberalism and republicanism were in tension from the outset, and Christianity has been employed effectively in support of both sides. On the one hand, the sole justification and purpose of government is the protection of each and every individual’s rights to life, liberty, and property. Consistently applied this means that all morals legislation and economic regulation are unjust and invalid. On the other hand, republicans like Algernon Sidney and John Adams feared that liberty unrestrained will degenerate into license, that virtue ought to be promoted and/or required, and vice discouraged and/or prohibited, with the coercive and legal power of the state; and that republican or civic virtue is necessary and must be somehow enforced and inculcated in the people if liberty and the republic are to be sustained. While some liberals have and continue to deny the virtue of virtue, ethical neutrality or relativism is not an inherent feature of liberalism and many liberals do indeed hold and advocate firm moral convictions.

[Keep reading…]

Tibor Machan has also been to a Philadelphia Society meeting. (See my reflections on the meeting I attended.) I think there were a lot more neocons there when I attended than when he did. In fact, he writes of one of the first neocons, Irving Kristol, presenting a novel idea to traditional conservatives: we need a war once in a while to promote national unity and loyalty among the American people, especially the young. Imagine that! Such a Hegelian notion!

I’ve written on Hegel’s notions of the State and war for one of my classes; here are some excerpts:

Hegel conceived of the state as a sovereign individual. States, being sovereign, will quite naturally come into conflict with each other and go to war. Hegel doesn’t merely see war as a necessary evil, however. Indeed, like Randolph Bourne, he sees war as the health of the State. Only, unlike Bourne, he is not concerned with the State growing in such power and centralization that it breaks the bounds of constitutional limits. Hegel sees war as a good thing. States are an ethical unity and go to war to protect that unity, not merely from other States but from internal forces. The State recognizes that the enforced unity brought about by war is needed to preserve itself from its own internal contradictions (or in Hegel’s mind, the stresses of civil society). “[W]ar is a ‘moment’ in the ethical life of the state.”1 In war, individual citizens are educated in the ethical Idea when they submerge and lose their individuality in the universal, in the common will pursuing the State’s goal of self-preservation.

States seemingly paradoxically have equally legitimate sets of conflicting rights and therefore have no rights against each other. Why States have no rights against each other when individuals do is not entirely clear. (Are rights are a purely political construction for Hegel?) Hegel imports the Hobbesian notion of states being in a state of nature vis-à-vis each other. In Hegel’s philosophy of history, States (which are good) are paradoxically founded by evil actions and the tyrants who found them are considered “great” men due to their place in the rational process of history. Good is created through evil. Likewise, the question of right in wars between States is decided by world history; the outcome itself is history’s judgment. “[W]ar makes them unequal so that they can be unified, and this happens when one gives way to the other.”2

For Hegel history is a rational process with the end of actualizing absolute freedom for humanity. The State is the embodiment of the ethical Idea, of absolute freedom, for its citizens. It stands to reason, following Hegel’s obsession with the Idea, the synthesis of concrete and universal, that the State that most embodies the ethical Idea vis-à-vis other States is superior. World history is the final arbiter in this matter, but world history is progressive and rational. This implies a growing rationality as history marches forward. Hegel thought that modern warfare with modern weapons would be more humane than previously. Though history has proven him wrong by the sheer inhumanity of modern total war, for Hegel history must lead to the “complete and total rationalization of human kind” and thus “to the homogenization or unification of humanity characterized by an increased agreement over all the fundamental aims of life. The triumph of reason will mean the elimination of the grounds of all war and conflict because there will be nothing left to fight about. It will represent the final triumph of bourgeois civil society with its pacific and commercial interests over the political state which seeks preeminence in struggle and combat. In the final analysis Hegel’s idea of an end of history undercuts his insistence on the necessity of war.”3

The State, then, would seem to be a “moment” in the rational historical process leading to the triumph of reason in absolute freedom for man. Is this where Hegel intends to go? I am not sure. Such a future may entail the emergence of a World-State, as Hegel’s philosophy of history would seem to necessitate. Alternatively, in light of Hegel’s claim that a State is no more an actual State without other States than an individual is an actual “person without rapport with other persons[,]” perhaps such a future will resemble a kind of Kantian international order of liberal republican States.4

Some neocons have some strikingly Hegelian notions about the family, civil society, the State, and war; Kristol’s notion that we need a good war once in a while, in particular.

What ever happened to Jefferson’s “Every generation needs a new revolution”?

(Thanks to Chris Matthew Sciabarra for the link to Tibor Machan’s article.)

  1. Steven B. Smith, “Hegel’s Views on War, the State, and International Relations,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 77 (1983), p. 627.
  2. Hegel, quoted in ibid., p. 630.
  3. Ibid., p. 631.
  4. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M. Knox, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 212.