metaphysics

Part of my college essays series: This is one of the essays I wrote during the political theory general exam for my PhD. The exam was an approximately 15-hour marathon session, involving 6 out of 12 essay questions, for a final total of 33 double-spaced pages written without access to any notes or sources.

Some scholars, particularly postmoderns, argue that hermeneutical interpretation is essential to “the so-called social sciences of human beings.” Hermeneutical interpretation originated, to my knowledge, in Biblical exegesis. It has since been extended beyond this sphere, but hermeneutical interpretation is still thought of in terms of the interpretation of texts, although no longer limited to written documents. Hermeneutical interpretation can be applied to our life stories and to oral narratives as well. In hermeneutics there is the tendency to view a text as not having a single fixed meaning. Furthermore, the meaning of a text is not determined solely by authorial intent.

Hermeneutics involves a tripartite or trilateral relationship between the author, the text, and the interpreter. The author and the interpreter each bring their own particular horizon of experience to the text. To be sure, the author presumably has a certain purpose in mind in writing or creating his text and intends for it to have a certain meaning. The author is operating within a particular historical context, however, in which words and sentence structure and such have particular meanings that can change with time. The author’s life has involved formative experiences enmeshed in particular ideas and events that have had at least some influence on him, much of which he may not be consciously aware. The same can be said of the interpreter, whose historical experience and language-use may be vastly different from those of the author. And, moreover, since one cannot have direct and complete access to the author’s mind, interpretation is necessary.

There exist a number of hermeneutical techniques. Perhaps the most general is simply that of the hermeneutical circle. When the interpreter engages the text, he brings with him his horizon of experience, his own world so to speak, and he will inevitably begin to engage the text from this standpoint. As he explores the text, he will gain an overall understanding of its meaning to him and what the author might have meant it to mean, but successive and more careful readings will likely lead to reevaluations and readjustments of that overall understanding which in turn will affect successive readings. Ideally there will be some sort of fusing or integration or broadening of horizons in this hermeneutical process. One must be open to different horizons, however, for interpretation to occur.

One particular type of hermeneutical technique was developed by Leo Strauss. This technique focuses on esoteric writing, or hidden meanings built into the text by the author, beneath the exoteric writing, or superficial meaning, of the text. Strauss argues that esoteric writing is likely to occur in times of great persecution, in which the author would likely be condemned, punished, and suppressed for expressing his views openly. In such cases, the interpreter must examine the text carefully for esoteric meaning. There appears to be some controversy as to whether and how much historical context matters in such interpretation. While there may be some usefulness to this technique – some thinkers may very well have been circumspect in their writing – I do see considerable danger in it (as highlighted by Pocock and others). The technique could be used carelessly, seems to presuppose infallibility, consistency, and genius where it might not be warranted, and could also be used for elitist, secretive purpose.

[Keep reading…]

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I found this brief restatement of what I take to be Ayn Rand’s epistemological argument against God in my files. I had jotted it down years ago  in college.

Existents have identity.                                                   E + I
Identity constitutes specific characteristics.              I + S
Infinity denotes unspecifiable characteristics.         N + ~S
If God is infinite, then God has no identity.              G + N > G + ~I
God is infinite.                                                                   G + N
Therefore, God has no identity.                                    G + ~I
Something has identity or it does not exist.              I v ~E
Therefore, God does not exist.                                      G + ~E

Basically, in her view, God is an invalid concept. He is indefinable, described by what he is not, by way of analogy, unique and therefore not within the conceptual realm (a concept involves reference to two or more concretes in reality). Infinity in the metaphysical or ontological sense used above (as opposed to its epistemological meaning, say in mathematics) is another invalid concept, since something that is infinite would not be limited by anything, would have characteristics that are unspecified; it is everything and therefore nothing (or, the concept omits everything and is therefore nothing); it is not definable.

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This is from a page of notes I put together in grad school for a presentation on Aristotle’s Prime Mover.

Sources: De Anima III.5, Metaphysics XII (especially 7 & 9), Physics VIII (especially 8-10).

PDF version.

Characteristics of the Prime Mover (Divine Nous)

  • First principle
  • First mover (logically, not temporally); itself unmoved and unmovable/unalterable
  • Substance (and arguably form) without matter
  • Self-thinking thought
  • Eternal and in eternal possession of its object (thought); therefore always active and never passive, always actuality and never potentiality.
  • Simple and one
  • Final cause; that for the sake of which; moves others by love; produces movement through infinite time (not a temporal first cause)
  • Necessary
  • Most good
  • Living, insofar as thought itself is the highest expression of life
  • No magnitude (and so neither finite nor infinite)
  • Without parts and indivisible

The Ordered Universe

  • “[T]he universe is of the nature of a whole” (M XII.1). “[T]he world is not such that one thing has nothing to do with another, but they are connected. For all are ordered together to one end” (M XII.10). “There always was motion and always will be motion throughout all time” (P XIII.9), i.e., the universe is eternal; not created or generated ex nihilo. The Prime Mover is the original source of motion in the universe and is the ordering principle that makes the universe a whole. The Prime Mover, God, the Divine, “encloses the whole of nature” (end of M XII.8).

Human Nous and Divine Nous

  • Men participate in the divine insofar as they contemplate the higher things (Nicomachean Ethics and M XII.7).
  • Can the human soul survive death? In Metaphysics XII.3 Aristotle suggests that it can, “albeit not all soul but [only] the reason.”

Contra Plato (M XII.5-6)

  • For Plato everything in the phenomenal world is a mere imperfect, particular manifestation of the Ideas or Forms. Each Idea or Form is universal in the sense of being one. In Metaphysics XII (and also in NE), Aristotle rejects universals of this sort. “The primary principles of all things are the actual primary ‘this’ and another thing which exists potentially. The universal causes, then, of which we spoke do not exist. For the individual is the source of the individuals. For while man is the cause of man universally, there is no universal man” (M XII.5). For Plato, the Agathon (the Good), at least in the Symposium and the Republic and prior to the Sophist, is beyond being. One might argue that Plato’s “mature metaphysics” expressed in the Sophist precludes this, however.
  • For Aristotle it is particulars that exist and the forms are always forms of individual particulars. Aristotle’s universals are not physically separable and independently existing things but rather are aspects of the nature of particulars, which we can separate out mentally by a process of abstraction. For example, the universal ‘man’ does not exist for Aristotle except insofar as it can be located in all the individual men who have ever lived, are living, or will ever live. The same might be said of the Prime Mover; insofar as it is the first mover, the organizing principle of the universe, and encloses the whole of nature, it might be reasonable to say (although I’m not certain that Aristotle would agree) that it is the form of reality, the logical structure of reality. Arguably the Metaphysics introduces separable substances, but even so for Aristotle nothing, not even the Prime Mover, is beyond being.

~~~

Now, I’m an atheist, but I believe there is a logical structure of reality. I don’t think my views are entirely inconsistent with Aristotle’s idea of the Prime Mover. For more on this, see Roderick Long’s “Theism and Atheism Reconciled” and “The Unspeakable Logos.”

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Last semester I took an independent study/readings course on formal ontology and phenomenology. I read some of the work of Edmund Husserl, Adolf Reinach, and Barry Smith. There is, I think, a lot to like about phenomenology, realist phenomenology at least.

In attempting to clarify my own objections to Husserl’s transcendental turn, the notorious transcendental reduction, I ran across this fantastic gem by Karl Schuhmann and Barry Smith entitled “Against Idealism: Johannes Daubert vs. Husserl’s Ideas I.” I had trouble understanding Husserl and, especially, formulating objections to him because of his penchant for using terms in ways completely different from how I and many others of his time were used to.

In reading Schuhmann and Smith’s paper on Daubert, I was struck by apparent parallels between his thought and that of Ayn Rand. Unfortunately, I don’t know how deep the parallel’s run because none of Daubert’s work is published in English, much less any language. The translated quotations, mainly on the subjects of metaphysics (ontology) and epistemology, cited in a few articles by Schuhmann and Smith are about all there is.

I did, however, attempt tentatively to trace some of the parallels between Rand and Daubert in these areas in my final paper for the course. Here is the result of my efforts: “Against Idealism: Rand and Daubert vs. Husserl’s Ideas I.” If Rand was familiar with Husserl or his Ideas, I am not aware of it. Daubert, however, was intimately familiar with Husserl’s work and had a chance to react to it in his own work. In my paper, I attempt to show how Ayn Rand might have objected to Husserl as well and how her work is similar to Daubert’s in this regard.

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