ethics

Part of my college essays series: This is one of the essays I wrote during the political theory general exam for my PhD. The exam was an approximately 15-hour marathon session, involving 6 out of 12 essay questions, for a final total of 33 double-spaced pages written without access to any notes or sources.

Some scholars, particularly postmoderns, argue that hermeneutical interpretation is essential to “the so-called social sciences of human beings.” Hermeneutical interpretation originated, to my knowledge, in Biblical exegesis. It has since been extended beyond this sphere, but hermeneutical interpretation is still thought of in terms of the interpretation of texts, although no longer limited to written documents. Hermeneutical interpretation can be applied to our life stories and to oral narratives as well. In hermeneutics there is the tendency to view a text as not having a single fixed meaning. Furthermore, the meaning of a text is not determined solely by authorial intent.

Hermeneutics involves a tripartite or trilateral relationship between the author, the text, and the interpreter. The author and the interpreter each bring their own particular horizon of experience to the text. To be sure, the author presumably has a certain purpose in mind in writing or creating his text and intends for it to have a certain meaning. The author is operating within a particular historical context, however, in which words and sentence structure and such have particular meanings that can change with time. The author’s life has involved formative experiences enmeshed in particular ideas and events that have had at least some influence on him, much of which he may not be consciously aware. The same can be said of the interpreter, whose historical experience and language-use may be vastly different from those of the author. And, moreover, since one cannot have direct and complete access to the author’s mind, interpretation is necessary.

There exist a number of hermeneutical techniques. Perhaps the most general is simply that of the hermeneutical circle. When the interpreter engages the text, he brings with him his horizon of experience, his own world so to speak, and he will inevitably begin to engage the text from this standpoint. As he explores the text, he will gain an overall understanding of its meaning to him and what the author might have meant it to mean, but successive and more careful readings will likely lead to reevaluations and readjustments of that overall understanding which in turn will affect successive readings. Ideally there will be some sort of fusing or integration or broadening of horizons in this hermeneutical process. One must be open to different horizons, however, for interpretation to occur.

One particular type of hermeneutical technique was developed by Leo Strauss. This technique focuses on esoteric writing, or hidden meanings built into the text by the author, beneath the exoteric writing, or superficial meaning, of the text. Strauss argues that esoteric writing is likely to occur in times of great persecution, in which the author would likely be condemned, punished, and suppressed for expressing his views openly. In such cases, the interpreter must examine the text carefully for esoteric meaning. There appears to be some controversy as to whether and how much historical context matters in such interpretation. While there may be some usefulness to this technique – some thinkers may very well have been circumspect in their writing – I do see considerable danger in it (as highlighted by Pocock and others). The technique could be used carelessly, seems to presuppose infallibility, consistency, and genius where it might not be warranted, and could also be used for elitist, secretive purpose.

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In an undergrad philosophy class on problems in ethical theory, taught by libertarian James Stacey Taylor (who introduced me to the IHS), we were required to write 300-words-or-less summaries of each chapter of the philosophy books we were reading. It’s not easy summarizing 10-30 pages of academic philosophy into 300 words or less, and such summaries are not good vehicles for debates, but it was good exercise in learning how to identify what’s essential and what’s not as well as how to write concisely. Anyway, here is my summary from that class of Christine Korsgaard‘s entire book, The Sources of Normativity. I can’t remember what the word-count limit was for this, but the summary is only 661 words. Korsgaard is a very prominent modern Kantian. Needless to say, I don’t buy into the Kantian paradigm; but my disagreements are not on display in this summary.

Korsgaard’s Sources of Normativity
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In laying out her theory for the source of normativity, Christine Korsgaard attempts to be inclusive by integrating her own variations on voluntarism, realism, reflective endorsement, and appeal to autonomy. Korsgaard’s theory culminates in her account of practical identity and the value of one’s humanity. The result purports to be an objective and universal theory of meta-ethics.

Korsgaard’s goal is to show that we do have moral obligations irrespective of our individual desires. As reflective beings, we must reflexively endorse a desire if it is to be considered a reason to act. Korsgaard turns inward the voluntarist formulation of legislator and citizen, positing the thinking self and acting self as our double nature. The thinking self has the power to command the acting self.

Human beings must act under the idea of free will. To be autonomous, however, one cannot merely follow one’s desires; one must have a goal and one must have a reason to reach that goal. The reason cannot be imposed by an external source. Autonomy requires self-imposed laws, which cannot be picked arbitrarily.

The Categorical Imperative tells us to act only on a maxim that can be consistently willed into a universal law. A good maxim is an intrinsically normative entity. Korsgaard avoids the trap of substantive moral realism by arguing that we have no need for recourse to intuition if we can show something’s intrinsic properties make it a final good. We can do this with a maxim, for it has the form of a law by virtue of its intrinsic properties, and it is this that makes it a final reason for action. This is still procedural realism. Values are created through our legislative wills by the procedure of making laws for ourselves.

Korsgaard distinguishes the categorial imperative from the moral law, which “tells us to act only on maxims that all rational beings could agree to act on together in a workable cooperative system.” The former is the law of a free will, but the traditional Kantian argument does not establish the moral law as the law of a free will. Only a law that ranges over every rational being will be a moral law. It is our practical identities that guide us in our acquisition of moral law and the actions we take based on them. These laws are constrained by the Categorical Imperative.

Our practical identities give us reasons to act in one way rather than another. It is unthinkable to act contrary to our identity. When we are acting under volitional necessity, that is, when all actions but one are unthinkable then we are most autonomous. As autonomous reflective beings that act for reasons, we must value our practical identities. “It is the conceptions of ourselves that are most important to us that give rise to unconditional obligations. For to violate them is to lose your integrity and so your identity, and to no longer be who you are.” If we value our practical identities then we must also value our humanity, for it is our humanity that makes our practical identities possible. It is here, in the Self, that Korsgaard locates the source of normativity.

Like some realists, Korsgaard holds that reasons are intrinsically normative entities. However, she rejects the commonly held belief that reasons are private, and that one can derive public reasons from private reasons. Taking a cue from Wittgenstein’s public language argument, she argues that if private reasons existed then they would be incommunicable to others. A private reason would be a reason only for X, whereas public reasons are reasons for all agents relatively similar to X. Reasons are inherently public. Since human beings have only reasons that can be shared, if we value our own humanity we must recognize that we share that humanity with others and so must value the humanity of others as well. To do otherwise would constitute a failure to be consistent. Herein lies our moral obligations to others.

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