First, I wish to answer the charge of gnosticism that might be leveled by followers of the political philosopher Eric Voegelin. Voegelin is very popular in certain conservative and communitarian circles, particularly those averse to philosophical systems and principled, as opposed to practical or pragmatic or “realist,” politics.¹ I should know; I studied political science and philosophy at Louisiana State University where Voegelin had been a prominent professor. Indeed, LSU is home to the Eric Voegelin Institute for American Renaissance Studies. I was introduced to the work of Voegelin by Professor Ellis Sandoz, a student of Voegelin himself and the director of the institute.

Gnosticism, as Voegelin uses the term, essentially means a “type of thinking that claims absolute cognitive mastery of reality. Relying as it does on a claim to gnosis, gnosticism considers its knowledge not subject to criticism. As a religious or quasi-religious movement, gnosticism may take transcendentalizing (as in the case of the Gnostic movement of late antiquity) or immanentizing forms (as in the case of Marxism).” Now, does that sound like it applies to libertarianism, much less Austro-libertarianism? Rather, it makes me think in particular of the constructivist rationalism, criticized incisively by Friedrich Hayek, that arose out of the Enlightenment and pervades various forms of modern statism.

In his political analysis, Voegelin uses the term to refer to a certain kind of mass movement, particularly mass political movements. As examples, he gives “progressivism, positivism, Marxism, psychoanalysis, communism, fascism, and national socialism.”² In his view, the consequences wrought by these movements have been disastrous. With few and only partial qualifications, I do not disagree. What makes them gnostic are certain similar characteristics they share with the original Gnostic religious movement of antiquity. Before listing the main characteristics, it first bears pointing out that even the broad libertarian movement as a whole might not yet qualify as a mass movement. However, as Voegelin points out, “none of the movements cited began as a mass movement; all derived from intellectuals and small groups,”³ so contemporary libertarianism and Aristotelian liberalism are not off the hook yet! With regard to the following list, Voegelin cautions that the six characteristics, “taken together, reveal the nature of the gnostic attitude.”⁴

1) It must first be pointed out that the Gnostic is dissatisfied with his situation. This, in itself, is not especially surprising. We all have cause to be not completely satisfied with one aspect or another of the situation in which we find ourselves.

Despite Voegelin’s caveat it seems this characteristic does not carry much explanatory power. It would seem more relevant if the dissatisfaction manifests as a form of profound alienation from the world, from the society as a whole in which one lives, or from its government. Certainly liberals and libertarians must feel some alienation, but is it enough to really count significantly toward gnosticism?

2) Not quite so understanding is the second aspect of the gnostic attitude: the belief that the drawbacks of the situation can be attributed to the fact that the world is intrinsically poorly organized. For it is likewise possible to assume that the order of being as it is given to us men (wherever its origin is to be sought) is good and that it is we human beings who are inadequate. But gnostics are not inclined to discover that human beings in general and they themselves in particular are inadequate. If in a given situation something is not as it should be, then the fault is to be found in the wickedness of the world.

Voegelin comes dangerously close here to extreme pessimism and fatalism, and to absolving people of their responsibility for not behaving as well as they should and are able. On the other hand, it seems from his description of the gnostic that the gnostic too flirts with, even embraces, absolving people of responsibility: It is not their fault; they could not help it; all the blame rests with flawed institutions and/or deterministic socio-economic and historical forces.

Liberalism, particularly the version of liberalism (or libertarianism) presented in my dissertation, avoids both of these extremes. In order to approach and achieve our ideal, human nature need not be changed. What is necessary is education and a change of institutions. There is a reciprocal causal relationship between people and their institutions; people shape them and are influenced in turn. Institutions present definite behavioral incentives and disincentives. But responsibility for one’s behavior ultimately resides in the individual.

3) The third characteristic is the belief that salvation from the evil of the world is possible.

Salvation is certainly too strong a word for what we expect from our ideal society. It would bring greater material and spiritual prosperity, less injustice, i.e., less crime, exploitation, and war. But it will not bring heaven on earth or personal salvation. There will still be crime, some wealth and income inequality (for that is only natural), scarcity, unhappiness, and suffering. It will simply be much better than conditions are now. All the evils that exist in the world are created by human beings, and while these evils cannot all be eradicated entirely, they need not be as great and prevalent are they are and have been.

4) From this follows the belief that the order of being will have to be changed in an historical process. From a wretched world a good one must evolve historically. This assumption is not altogether self-evident, because the Christian solution might also be considered — namely, that the world throughout history will remain as it is and that man’s salvational fulfillment is brought about through grace in death.

Perhaps some contemporary classical liberals and libertarians believe there is an inexorable progressive historical process tending toward a final stage of history, but I do not think most do. Indeed, there is nothing guaranteed about achieving our ideal and even should it be achieved there is no guarantee that it will last forever. Human beings and human society being what they are, it is always possible for the necessary traditions and institutions to erode in the minds and hearts of men over the course of generations.

5) With this fifth point we come to the Gnostic trait in the narrower sense — the belief that a change in the order of being lies in the realm of human action, that this salvational act is possible through man’s own effort.⁵

Classical liberalism and libertarianism in general, and the account presented in my dissertation in particular, do not seek to change the entire order of being. Some things, like the laws of physics and of economics, just cannot be changed by man. The only changes that are sought lie within the realms of personal education and morality as well as social, economic, and political institutions. These are changes that are within the realm of human action. Unlike other political movements, however, the changes and goals of liberalism properly conceived cannot be achieved by aggression, top-down central planning, or sudden and violent cultural revolutions. Rather, they can only be achieved through persuasion, education, the building up of alternative institutions — in short, a far from inevitable process of social evolution driven by purposeful, but not centrally coordinated, human action, the results of which on the macro-level will not be of human design. It will take generations, but “anyone who fights for the future, lives in it today.”⁶

6) If it is possible, however, so to work a structural change in the given order of being that we can be satisfied with it as a perfect one, then it becomes the task of the gnostic to seek out the prescriptions for such change. Knowledge — gnosis — of the method of altering being is the central concern of the gnostic. As the sixth feature of the gnostic attitude, therefore, we recognize the construction of a formula for self and world salvation, as well as the gnostic’s readiness to come forward as a prophet who will proclaim his knowledge about the salvation of mankind.⁷

Even non-gnostic movements have their leaders and their “prophets.” Knowledge is necessary for any human endeavor. This is another feature that does not really add much by itself. Features 2-5 seem to do the bulk of the explanatory work. Taking all six features into consideration together, it seems we can say conclusively that liberalism, particularly Aristotelian liberalism, does not qualify as a gnostic political movement. Aristotelian liberalism is about liberty and human flourishing; it is no more gnostic than Aristotle’s ethical and political philosophy.

In answering the hypothetical charge of gnosticism, the charge of utopianism has partially been met as well. The conception of human nature presented in my dissertation is, I think, a realistic one and the ideal society envisioned does not require human nature somehow to be miraculously changed in order for it to be brought about and maintained. The ideal society is not a perfect one in an otherworldly Platonic or Christian sense. It will not bring Heaven on Earth or usher in the End of History. We do not seek to immanentize the eschaton.

I take the moral case to have been made fairly strongly in my dissertation, although the case can always be strengthened by fleshing the arguments out more fully and presenting more than time or space allowed there or in a blogpost. What I did not spend much time addressing in my dissertation is the question of practicality, which raises objections that are variations on the theme “it will never work.” Addressing this question is largely beyond the scope of my dissertation and this blogpost. I must restrict myself to saying a few things.

The moral/practical dichotomy does not sit well within Aristotelian philosophy. As I have argued elsewhere, Aristotelian virtue ethics, unlike most modern ethics, does not recognize a natural tension between what is moral and what is in one’s rational or enlightened self-interest. Immorality is never practical or in one’s rational self-interest in this view, even though a Hobbes or a Machiavelli would counsel otherwise. Moreover, if a critic is not convinced of the practicality, that does not by itself obviate the moral case; arguments need to be presented against the latter as well. This is simply a point about proper argumentation and should not be taken as implying an embrace of a theory/practice dichotomy. It is sometimes said, “Well, it’s good in theory but it doesn’t work in practice.” But this is nonsense. If a theory is inapplicable to reality, then it is not a good theory.

The various theories of statism have been making a royal mess of things for centuries now. Perhaps it is time to try something radically different. Ronald Hamowy has observed that “For at least two hundred years [owing to the Scottish Enlightenment], social philosophers have known that association does not need government, that, indeed, government is destructive of association.”⁸ Scottish Enlightenment thinkers like Adam Ferguson, David Hume, and Adam Smith as well as modern thinkers like Austrian economist F.A. Hayek have theorized about and described the emergence of society, culture, law, language, and markets as spontaneous orders. Austrian economists, libertarians, and others have built up a significant body of literature that demonstrates both theoretically and historically that legislative law and state-provided goods and services are inferior to other institutions in civil society: free markets and free enterprises, cultural norms, customary law and polycentric legal systems, and private organizations such as the family, churches, private schools, clubs, fraternal orders, and the like.⁹

1. In Science, Politics, and Gnosticism, Voegelin writes: “Gnosis desires dominion over being; in order to seize control of being the gnostic constructs his system. The building of systems is a gnostic form of reasoning, not a philosophical one” (p. 32). It can never be an attempt to understand being at it is? I think Voegelin makes a spurious generalization here. When one reads further, it becomes apparent that he makes this mistake at least in part because he believes in a Christian Beyond that is not amenable to (human) reason. ↩

2. Eric Voegelin, Science, Politics, and Gnosticism (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 1968 [2004]) p. 61. See also, Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics: An Introduction (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1952 [1987]). ↩

3. Ibid., p. 62 ↩

4. Ibid., p. 64; emphasis mine. ↩

5. Ibid., pp. 64-65. ↩

6. Ayn Rand, The Romantic Manifesto: A Philosophy of Literature (New York: Signet/Penguin Books, 1975; Revised Edition), p. viii. ↩

7. Voegelin (1968 [2004]), p. 65. ↩

8. Ronald Hamowy, The Political Sociology of Freedom: Adam Ferguson and F.A. Hayek (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2005; New Thinking In Political Economy Series), pp. 236-237. ↩

9. See the bibliography of my dissertation and a footnote in the concluding chapter for an extensive list of references. There are too many to convert for this blogpost. ↩

Addendum (10:47 pm): Speaking of anarchy, check out this discussion on anarchy, minarchy, and (an/the?) Anarchism Anti-Defamation League at L&P sparked by Sheldon Richman. I just left a comment defending anarchy and anarchists from a rhetorical (one might say sophistical) trick by Irfan Khawaja. You’ll see what I mean when you read the discussion, but I say rhetorical or sophistical because like most minarchists Irfan seems to be readily dismissive of anarchy, makes unsupported assertions in favor of minarchy, and attempts to undermine anarchism by claiming there is a one-sided relationship regarding anarchists defaming the minarchist state using examples of failures by states minarhists wouldn’t support and statists defaming anarchy using examples of chaos to which anarchists deny the label anarchism. The anarchists, he claims, want to have their cake and eat it too; they simply like to defame the state but don’t like it when minarchists and other statists defame anarchy. The difference lies, I think, in the tendency among anarchists to appreciate and understand the moral and economic deficiencies of the state, but the veritable dearth of minarchists who take anarchism even half seriously. The relationship is actually the opposite of what he claims. The day I see minarchists making an effort to appreciate, understand, and deal with the moral and practical arguments in favor of anarchism is the day that the relationship will not be altogether one-sided.

I agree with Chris that there are multiple strategies for bringing about such a society. Indeed, multiple strategies will be necessary. No single strategy will work by itself. I also agree with Chris that politics is one of them, albeit a limited one (particularly in today’s corrupt environment). Generally, to succeed in politics one must not only compromise one’s principles but become very good at it. The more statist the society, the more this is true. And even if you can get elected without compromising your principles, it is difficult if not impossible to get anything done (at least at the national level) that is moral and just. Texas Representative Ron Paul is arguably the only virtuous national politician, but even his vote is only 1 in 435. I’m sure he does some good, especially as part of the committee that oversees the Fed, but his influence and power are limited. Moreover, one must not overlook the danger of being co-opted as one begins to see success in politics.

Again, I agree with Chris that the battle is primarily a cultural one on the level of personal and socio-cultural (including business firms) principles and institutions. There are multiple avenues by which to approach this culture war. In academia, libertarians can continue to plug away with libertarian-themed journal articles and books as well as, and perhaps more importantly, providing an increasing number of students with an antidote to woefully inadequate and mistaken statist education (both in public and private schools). Outside of academia one can promote libertarian ideas in the media (op-eds, letters to the editor, tv news commentaries, documentaries, blogs and websites, etc.), in the arts and entertainment (fiction writing (from short stories to novels), comic books, cartoons, music, plays, tv shows, movies, etc.), having children and teaching them libertarian ideas, by ignoring the State as much as possible and creating and encouraging the growth of alternative societal institutions (such as homeschooling, fraternal societies, clubs, neighborhood committees, church-related organizations, charities, and new businesses). This is partly the rational evangelism that John disparages, but not entirely. Rational argumentation often has little effect by itself on those who are old and set in their ways, but the young are more open to new, radical, and true ideas. Moreover, what Chris and I advocate is not rational argumentation merely, but rational action. Different people have different talents and resources to bring to bear on this culture war and so will be better at different avenues of attack. You should do what you can. Rational argumentation will often play a role but it must be supplemented by, or rather supplement, a bevy of other strategies many of which I have already mentioned.

One important avenue that I have mentioned, and John emphasizes as well, is libertarian-run businesses. Yet business, while important, is only one institution of collective action that libertarians can use to ignore, avoid, and undermine the State. John also includes a related issue: invention. I certainly agree that certain new technologies can and will be used to help to create a libertarian-anarchic society. However, John’s argument that so-called “rational evangelism” won’t work and that “the state will have it’s [sic] way as long as enough people approve of it…is simply not the case” is wrong, and his focus on the role of technology borders on determinism. Are certain advanced technologies necessary in order to bring about and maintain a libertarian-anarchic society? John has not explicitly told us if this is the case, and if so, why; but his argument seems to imply that it is. Moreover, if certain technologies are necessary for liberty, then it appears that in a society without said technologies there is an inescapable gulf between the moral and the practical. Ultimately, what technologies are invented and how they will be used is determined by ideas. Email encryption won’t do people much good if people think that they are obligated to let the government through it, or if a majority of the people think the State has the right to punish those who don’t. It is the ideas that people hold that we need to change. Technology can be a useful tool, both for bringing about such change and for keeping out and ignoring the State. Libertarians with the expertise could work on inventing, promoting, selling, and defending new technologies that can serve the libertarian cause.

I think John and I are in agreement about the limited usefulness of collective political movements like the Libertarian Party, however, although I’m not sure he would agree with me that they are not entirely useless or counterproductive.

Update (8/27): Chris’s blog post, “The Rose Petal Assumption,” is also an important read on this subject.

Update (8/28): Walter Block’s recent essay “Austrians in Academia: A Battle Plan” is also useful reading, although it is primarily geared toward economics graduate students and professors. Also, some of the advice for graduate students depends on the character and temperament of their committee members. Luckily, mine, at least so far, have not held my radical libertarianism against me when it comes to grading papers and exams and evaluating my M.A. thesis.

William J. Beck III over at www.two-four.net happened to read some of my exchange with Chris Sciabarra on anarchy and dualism. (See my posts here, here, and here.) For the most part I agree with what he wrote in his post (here), but there are two things about his post to which I wish to respond. First, is his assumption that in a libertarian-anarchist society all previously “governmental” functions would be run like businesses. Second, is his understandable confusion about what Chris and I mean by dualism and why it is dangerous.

1) I think the assumption that in a libertarian-anarchist society all previously “governmental” functions would be run like businesses is too hasty and most probably mistaken. It is conceivable that there might be many services that might be better provided or only provided by non-business institutions, perhaps in some cases instead of but also quite possibly alongside businesses. Take, for instance, unemployment “insurance.” Now, strictly speaking unemployment is not insurable. (See here (mp3 audio file) for why.) However, institutions like the family, the extended family, fraternal societies (like America had in the 19th century; see here), clubs, churches, neighborhood communities, and so forth, could provide support for the temporarily and unexpectedly unemployed while having the close proximity and knowledge of time and place necessary to prevent or minimize abuse of the service. Similarly for other services. Even security production need not be exclusively provided by businesses. In no way, however, do we need the State to provide all of these services and, indeed, it invariably does a poor job of providing them (not to speak of the other accompanying negatives).

2) I don’t have the time to provide a full explanation of what Chris and I mean by dualism and why we think it is problematic. A brief quote from Chris’s book Total Freedom: Toward a Dialectical Libertarianism will perhaps suffice: “Emerging out of the strict-atomist emphasis on analytical isolation, dualism is an orientation toward analysis by separation of a system’s components into two spheres. The dualist identifies two mutually exclusive, externally related spheres. These spheres are expressions of two distinct principles, which the dualist often sees as irreducible and in logical opposition to one another. However, while dualists share with atomists a commitment to external relations, they share with organicists a tendency toward systematization, albeit one that depends entirely upon the classification of all factors along two fundamental axes of inquiry.” (166-167; emphasis in original) We’re primarily concerned with methodology and the errors to which a flawed methodology can lead. The most pervasive dualist metaphysic is the notorious mind-body dichotomy, but dualism has resulted in a vast number of other false dichotomies: fact-value, analytic-synthetic, impositionist-reflectionist, altruist-egoist, anarchist-statist, State vs. Market. Often dualists hold one sphere to be superior to the other and project an eventual and necessary monist resolution as, for instance, the Market absorbs all of the functions of the parasitical State in an anarcho-capitalist society. Often both sides of these dichotomies contain some kernel of truth. One of the most noteworthy aspects of Rand’s philosophy is her largely successful attempt at transcending many of these false dichotomies.

Addendum: Chris has chimed in with a post of his own in response to mine. In it he expands somewhat on what I have said here. The only thing I would disagree with him on is his belief that “the anarchist resolution is not dialectical.” I say it depends on what kind of anarchist you are whether one’s “anarchist resolution” is dialectical or dualist. A Rothbardian anarcho-capitalist may indeed be a dualist, but libertarian anarchism as I have described it does not seem to be dualistic; indeed, it seems positively dialectical!

Update (08/21): Billy Beck responds to our posts, clarifying his position as well and taking me to task on my attempt to salvage the word ‘government’ from ordinary and corrupted usage. It seems he was using business terminology for market and non-market exchanges, transactions, and cooperation, much like Rand’s Trader Principle and her general talk of exchanging values. Okay, it seems we have no disagreement there. To head off any misunderstandings, I am a capitalist in the Randian, Misesian, and Rothbardian sense of that word. I’m also very much an Aristotelian/Randian natural rights theorist, and not a utilitarian. The crux of the issue seems to come down to my attempt to salvage the word ‘government’ from traditional identification with State politics. In short, the issue is primarily terminological and definitional. That’s fine. I don’t need to use the word ‘government’ and I may eventually decide that it isn’t worth salvaging. However, I can’t help but wonder why the terms ‘government’ and ‘governmental’ can’t be used to refer to a vast interconnected, overlapping web of polycentric legal, security, insurance, surety, assurance, and other institutions. Did not Thomas Jefferson talk about the “blessings of self-government“?

The key to elaborating a nondualist view of libertarian anarchy is not, I think, the melding of key Hayekian and Nockian insights regarding society, government, and the State. Although this point is important, the key lies in the recognition that there are different kinds of anarchy and that we can never really get out of anarchy.

The formation of an international system of states quite obviously does not get us out of anarchy. This point is widely accepted even by the positivist-empiricist community of international relations scholars. The international system of states is characterized as anarchic, because there is no overarching monopolistic authority to promulgate law, provide security, or resolve disputes. I have termed this category of anarchy Hobbesian State Anarchy. It’s most obvious anarchic relationship is that between states, but there are other anarchic relationships included in this category as well. The State and its citizens are in an anarchic relationship, for there is no overarching authority governing this relationship. In any dispute between citizen and State, the citizen must turn to the State (or some branch thereof) for the ultimate decision. Ironically, although one of the defects that Locke saw in his fictitious state of nature was that there would be no third party to resolve disputes (a defect because of the widely held belief that men should not judge their own case due to an unavoidable bias in their own favor), the monopolistic State always ends up judging its own cases! Moreover, the relationship between citizens of different states and between states and the citizens of other states is also anarchic for, I think, obvious reasons. Only if one accepts some sort of strained social contract theory a la Hobbes or Locke would have reason to deny these additional anarchic relationships. Hobbes and Locke see the State or Commonwealth as being one corporate body, thus eliminating the possibility of anarchic relationships within that body (even when foreigners are involved). Locke, however, did argue that if the sovereign violated the rights of citizens the Commonwealth is essentially sundered and plunged into a state of war. I do not think that the mystical union of the corporate body that is the Hobbesian or Lockean Commonwealth is true to the facts of reality, however.

The formation of a World-State, or a Solar System State, or a Galactic State, or even a Universal State (in the physical sense of the world) cannot get us out of anarchy. International anarchy (that between states) is eliminated, as are the anarchic relationships between citizens of different states and between states and citizens of other states. However, if it is a unitary government (only one level of goverment) then the citizens are still in an anarchic relationship with the State. If it is a federal system, the states and their citizens are still in an anarchic relationship with the Super State. The attempt to find an overarching authority for all socio-political relationships is impossible, for even the most universal State imaginable would lack an overarching authority for its relationship with its citizens. In my previous post I mentioned Republican Anarchy as well, but I need not elaborate on it here.

Thus, we can never really get out of anarchy. The formation of different kinds of states merely alters the kind of anarchy within which we live. The question then is not Statism or Anarchism, state or anarchy. It is actually Statism and the State that introduce the dualistic false dichotomoy between living under law and order with the State or in chaos and disorder with anarchy. Statism introduces and/or perpetuates such dualisms as producers and pseudo-producers, wealth-makers and wealth-appropriators, masters and slaves, self-sacrifice vs. other-sacrifice, and many more. Insofar as anarchists have made their arguments along similar lines, using this false dichotomy (albeit while reversing the concommitants of law/order/prosperity and chaos/disorder/misery), they are mistakenly adopting the very dualistic premise of Statism.

We are always in some sort of anarchy. If there is a dualism inherent in libertarian anarchism, it is between society and the State or a free society and the State, and not between Market and State or Anarchy and State. But there are three major reasons why I do not believe there is a dualism here.

1) The primary political choice in this context is between which kind of anarchy is preferrable – Natural Anarchy, Hobbesian State Anarchy, or World-State Anarchy – not which kind of State is preferrable, or whether State or Anarchy is preferrable. The category of Natural Anarchy is not necessarily a libertarian anarchy; that would depend upon the kinds of institutions prevailent in a naturally anarchic society. There could be liberty, law, order, and flourishing, or there could be chaos, disorder, frequent initiation of force, and before long the rise of states and the shift to a different kind of anarchy.

2) Yes, there is a necessary mutual opposition between State and society, but the State is merely one organization/institution within society. It is not the only group of individuals/organizations/institutions (or even single individuals) that operates by the initiation of force and, thus, the violation of rights. And there are different kinds of states. There are also countless organizations and institutions within society that do not operate by the initiation for force. Ultimately, however, society is just a large number of individuals existing within certain social and structural relationships. The apparent opposition between State and society, and between other coercive organizations and society, boils down to an opposition between individuals who choose to live by the initiation of force and individuals who choose to live by voluntary exchange (even here we must recognize that many individuals operate by both methods). A free society along the lines of libertarian anarchism is one that exists in Natural Anarchy and in which a majority of the people relate with each other through voluntary means most of the time. What form government might take in such a society I will not speculate on here, except to say that law, security, and justice need not be provided only by market institutions but market institutions may make up a large part of such voluntary government.

3) The initiation of force is primarily a political (or structural level) concern. A fully nondualistic view of libertarian anarchy must take into account the socio-cultural and personal levels of analysis as well. Here we can recognize subtler forms of coercion, such as what might be called soft authoritarian institutions (paternalism, parentalism, tribalism, racism, nationalism, altruism, etc.), as well as psycho-epistemological, epistemological, ethical, aesthetic errors (and the socio-cultural institutions that encourage them) that hinder liberty and flourishing and promote statism. A truly ideal, free society will be one in which the majority of citizens possess and/or are encouraged by their social and structural institutions to be autonomous in the political and personal and social dimensions of their lives. I believe that an ideal libertarian-anarchic society will not be achieved, much less maintained, if we only attend to political and economic institutions. All three levels – the personal, t
he socio-cultural, and the structural (political and economic) will have to converge in order to bring about and maintain a free society. We will not get free political and economic institutions until we get liberty-promoting socio-cultural institutions and autonomous persons, and vice versa. Snapping a finger and eliminating the State overnight will not a free society make. A revolution on multiple levels will be required and it will take time. Is this utopian? Not in the sense of being impossible (as prosperous socialism is impossible). But it is idealistic (and I don’t mean this in a pejorative sense).

Ultimately, I think that political theories that assume straight out that we need some sort of State, including that of Rasmussen and Den Uyl, move too fast. Politics is not primarily about the State, but about (and here I show my Aristotelian colors) human flourishing and, consequently, about justice and rights. Whether and what kind of government is justified or needed are secondary questions. I do not believe the State is compatible with justice, rights, and human flourishing.

Note: Full appreciation of this post, since it is brief and sketchy, will require some familiarity with the sources discussed and cited herein.

To begin with, Sciabarra points out in Russian Radical that some have argued that Rand’s defense of individual rights logically commits her to anarchism even though she did not recognize it. Famously, Roy Childs made this argument on Objectivist grounds, though he later (mistakenly I think) recanted. Sciabarra also points out some anarchistic elements in Rand’s own political philosophy. For example, Rand opposed taxation as theft and conscription as slavery (see her essay “Government Financing in a Free Society” in The Virtue of Selfishness). A government that must rely solely on voluntary contributions (via donations, user fees, a lottery, etc.) would be one very unlike anything with which we are familiar. Rand’s definition of government does not necessarily entail a monopolistic institution: “Government is the means of placing the retaliatory use of physical force under objective control – i.e., under objectively defined laws” (“The Nature of Government” in VoS). However, her elaboration of her concept of government does require this. Rand’s contention that government requires a monopoly on the legitimate use of force in a given geographical area and that individuals must delegate their right of self-defense to this institution are the chief contradictions in her political philosophy. Interestingly, Rand apparently did not realize (and Sciabarra does not call her on it) that her definition of capitalism is inherently anarchistic: “Capitalism is a social system based on the recognition of individual rights, including property rights, in which all property is privately owned” (“What is Capitalism?” in Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal; emphasis mine). It seems to me that if all property is privately owned, then even Rand’s minimal State could not exist. At least some public property would have to exist and be controlled by government (the State) in order for it to fulfill its monopolistic role as provider of law, security, and justice. This seems to have escaped Sciabarra as well.

Rothbard supposedly sets up a dualism between market and State, a dualism that he apparently would prefer resolving itself into a monism of the market absorbing all of the functions of the State. Perhaps Rothbard was guilty of this to some degree, although I am not certain that this is the extent of Rothbard’s argument for anarcho-capitalism. In any event, I will here attempt to sketch out a nondualistic picture of anarchism.

To begin with, I submit that there are different kinds of anarchism and that Rothbard was aware of this. The following essays elaborate on these different types of anarchism: Alfred Cuzan’s “Do We Ever Really Get Out of Anarchy?” and James Ostrowski’s “The Myth of Democratic Peace.” Rothbard was familiar with Cuzan’s article in JLS. What Cuzan and Ostrowski argue is essentially this: Although the creation of numerous States gets the individual citizens of each out of anarchy with their fellow citizens, anarchy has merely been shifted to the international level between the States themselves. Moreover, anarchy still exists between the State and its subjects (ahem…citizens), between citizens of different States, and between States and the citizens of other States. Cuzan even argues that for States in which the power of government has some degree of separation of powers, the different branches of government are in a state of anarchy with each other because there is no overarching authority. Even the formation of a world government or World-State only eliminates international anarchy, not the other dimensions of anarchy. It is impossible to get completely out of anarchy. So the question then becomes not whether the State or anarchy is to be preferred, but which type of anarchy is to be preferred: Natural Anarchy, Hobbesian State Anarchy with or without Republican Anarchy, or World-State Anarchy with or without Republican Anarchy. (The terms for these categories are my own. See here for a rough illustration.)

To take my nondualistic view of anarchism further, one can combine the insights of F.A. Hayek and Albert J. Nock. For Hayek society is a spontaneous order within which exist numerous organizations (examples of planned order). One can conceive of a global society encompassing all of mankind on earth. Within the global society there are various governmental organizations called States. At this point, I would make Nock’s distinction between government and the State. Government is that institution or set of institutions that produce law, security, and justice without violating the rights of individuals. The State, on the other hand, is a governmental institution (and thus, I think, a perverted species of government), but by its very nature it violates the rights of individuals (citizens and noncitizens alike) and is parasitic upon society. The growth and encroachment of State power necessarily destroys social power (voluntary action, relationships, and exchange). With this distinction I would define the State as Rothbard has, as “that organization which possesses either or both (in actual fact, almost always both) of the following characteristics: (a) it acquires its revenue by physical coercion (taxation); and (b) it acquires a compulsory monopoly of force and of ultimate decision-making power over a given territorial area” (Ethics of Liberty, 172). Government is not monopolistic and need not be tied to a given geographic area; it is fully voluntary. Government, then, is compatible with anarchy (though my definition of government here is even more radical than that of Rand’s, but there always remains the danger that government will transform into a State. Although it is common among anarchists to emphasize that anarchy means ‘no government’ and not ‘no law’, under the view presented here anarchy does not necessarily have to mean ‘no government’ either but rather ‘no State’. Libertarian anarchy, or natural order, would still operate under the rule of law and, as Roderick Long has argued (here and here), radically decentralized constitutional restraints in the form of societal and market separation of powers, checks and balances (including but not limited to market competition).

Moreover, the market is on my view but one aspect of society, so my view is not a dualistic one of market vs. State, but rather one in which government and society are compatible within one of several different kinds of anarchy. While the State and society are still mutually opposed to one another, the State is a perversion of government. To co-opt a line from Ru
ssian Radical, describing Rand’s view, for my own purposes: “the initiation of force is a crucial component in the genesis of social dualism” (298). It is, rather, the State and statism that introduce dualism into society and not anarchism. The State, especially the modern State, is a historical phenomenon that needs to be overcome, although this overcoming is not guaranteed and will entail a veritable revolution on multiple levels: psycho-epistemological, epistemological, ethical, socio-cultural, economical, political, legal, aesthetic. I wholeheartedly agree with Sciabarra and Rand that simply changing or attempting to change our political and/or economic institutions without changing the rest will be disastrous or impossible. We cannot ignore the necessary foundations and concommitants of a viable free society.

I have obviously only provided the barest of sketches, but I think this suffices to point the way to a nondualistic view of libertarian anarchism.

Addendum (07/13): I should add that the State is not the only organization, institution, individual or set of individuals in society that operates via the initiation of physical force. Achieving libertarian anarchy is no guarantee not only that our society will remain free but also that all forms of force initiation have been eliminated. Examples could be: sporadic or organized crime, abusive family relationships, private slavery, and so forth. I merely see the State as being the chief enemy of liberty; it is the most visible, the best organized, the most powerful, and has the advantage of economies of scale in terms of the ability to violate rights on a massive scale. It is the greatest threat to individual liberty, but not the only threat. Moreover, there are more subtle forms of coercion than physical coercion (or the initiation of physical force). We need to be concerned not only with political autonomy but also with social autonomy (or independence from blind obedience to authority and the social structures that promote such) and personal autonomy (or being a harmonious, rational, integrated being; not being alienated from our subconscious, our emotions, and our body; not being ruled by our passions, fears, drugs, etc.). I’ll blog more on these three dimensions of autonomy at a later date. Discussions of anarchism and statism deal primarily with the structural level of analysis, but we must also bear in mind the personal and socio-cultural levels. Check out Sciabarra’s response post for his take on anarchism and dualism. My brief comments don’t do justice to his position on anarchism, minarchism, and Rothbard’s political thought.