This post is excerpted and adapted from the concluding chapter of my dissertation (so I suppose it might qualify as part of my college essays series), wherein I addressed two related objections to libertarianism in general and to my account of Aristotelian liberalism in particular: utopianism and gnosticism, the latter being sort of a theological version of the former. Does the theory of virtue ethics and natural rights described in my dissertation represent an impossibly high standard of ethical excellence? On a related note, is it foolishly impractical given the current shoddy state of the world? And is the ideal society suggested by my nonstatist conception of politics and severe critique of the state an impossible goal? Even if it is achieved, will it ring in a perfect world of peace, love, and happiness without violence, misfortune, and suffering? Naturally, my short answer to all of these questions is “No.”

First, I wish to answer the charge of gnosticism that might be leveled by followers of the political philosopher Eric Voegelin. Voegelin is very popular in certain conservative and communitarian circles, particularly those averse to philosophical systems and principled, as opposed to practical or pragmatic or “realist,” politics. I should know; I studied political science and philosophy at Louisiana State University where Voegelin had been a prominent professor. Indeed, LSU is home to the Eric Voegelin Institute for American Renaissance Studies. I was introduced to the work of Voegelin by Professor Ellis Sandoz, a student of Voegelin himself and the director of the institute.

Gnosticism, as Voegelin uses the term, essentially means a “type of thinking that claims absolute cognitive mastery of reality. Relying as it does on a claim to gnosis, gnosticism considers its knowledge not subject to criticism. As a religious or quasi-religious movement, gnosticism may take transcendentalizing (as in the case of the Gnostic movement of late antiquity) or immanentizing forms (as in the case of Marxism).” Now, does that sound like it applies to libertarianism, much less Austro-libertarianism? Rather, it makes me think in particular of the constructivist rationalism, criticized incisively by Friedrich Hayek, that arose out of the Enlightenment and pervades various forms of modern statism.

In his political analysis, Voegelin uses the term to refer to a certain kind of mass movement, particularly mass political movements. As examples, he gives “progressivism, positivism, Marxism, psychoanalysis, communism, fascism, and national socialism.” In his view, the consequences wrought by these movements have been disastrous. With few and only partial qualifications, I do not disagree. What makes them gnostic are certain similar characteristics they share with the original Gnostic religious movement of antiquity. Before listing the main characteristics, it first bears pointing out that even the broad libertarian movement as a whole might not yet qualify as a mass movement. However, as Voegelin points out, “none of the movements cited began as a mass movement; all derived from intellectuals and small groups,” so contemporary libertarianism and Aristotelian liberalism are not off the hook yet! With regard to the following list, Voegelin cautions that the six characteristics, “taken together, reveal the nature of the gnostic attitude.”

1) It must first be pointed out that the Gnostic is dissatisfied with his situation. This, in itself, is not especially surprising. We all have cause to be not completely satisfied with one aspect or another of the situation in which we find ourselves.

Despite Voegelin’s caveat it seems this characteristic does not carry much explanatory power. It would seem more relevant if the dissatisfaction manifests as a form of profound alienation from the world, from the society as a whole in which one lives, or from its government. Certainly liberals and libertarians must feel some alienation, but is it enough to really count significantly toward gnosticism?

2) Not quite so understanding is the second aspect of the gnostic attitude: the belief that the drawbacks of the situation can be attributed to the fact that the world is intrinsically poorly organized. For it is likewise possible to assume that the order of being as it is given to us men (wherever its origin is to be sought) is good and that it is we human beings who are inadequate. But gnostics are not inclined to discover that human beings in general and they themselves in particular are inadequate. If in a given situation something is not as it should be, then the fault is to be found in the wickedness of the world.

Voegelin comes dangerously close here to extreme pessimism and fatalism, and to absolving people of their responsibility for not behaving as well as they should and are able. On the other hand, it seems from his description of the gnostic that the gnostic too flirts with, even embraces, absolving people of responsibility: It is not their fault; they could not help it; all the blame rests with flawed institutions and/or deterministic socio-economic and historical forces.

Liberalism, particularly the version of liberalism (or libertarianism) presented in my dissertation, avoids both of these extremes. In order to approach and achieve our ideal, human nature need not be changed. What is necessary is education and a change of institutions. There is a reciprocal causal relationship between people and their institutions; people shape them and are influenced in turn. Institutions present definite behavioral incentives and disincentives. But responsibility for one’s behavior ultimately resides in the individual.

3) The third characteristic is the belief that salvation from the evil of the world is possible.

Salvation is certainly too strong a word for what we expect from our ideal society. It would bring greater material and spiritual prosperity, less injustice, i.e., less crime, exploitation, and war. But it will not bring heaven on earth or personal salvation. There will still be crime, some wealth and income inequality (for that is only natural), scarcity, unhappiness, and suffering. It will simply be much better than conditions are now. All the evils that exist in the world are created by human beings, and while these evils cannot all be eradicated entirely, they need not be as great and prevalent are they are and have been.

4) From this follows the belief that the order of being will have to be changed in an historical process. From a wretched world a good one must evolve historically. This assumption is not altogether self-evident, because the Christian solution might also be considered – namely, that the world throughout history will remain as it is and that man’s salvational fulfillment is brought about through grace in death.

Perhaps some contemporary classical liberals and libertarians believe there is an inexorable progressive historical process tending toward a final stage of history, but I do not think most do. Indeed, there is nothing guaranteed about achieving our ideal and even should it be achieved there is no guarantee that it will last forever. Human beings and human society being what they are, it is always possible for the necessary traditions and institutions to erode in the minds and hearts of men over the course of generations.

5) With this fifth point we come to the Gnostic trait in the narrower sense – the belief that a change in the order of being lies in the realm of human action, that this salvational act is possible through man’s own effort.

Classical liberalism and libertarianism in general, and the account presented in my dissertation in particular, do not seek to change the entire order of being. Some things, like the laws of physics and of economics, just cannot be changed by man. The only changes that are sought lie within the realms of personal education and morality as well as social, economic, and political institutions. These are changes that are within the realm of human action. Unlike other political movements, however, the changes and goals of liberalism properly conceived cannot be achieved by aggression, top-down central planning, or sudden and violent cultural revolutions. Rather, they can only be achieved through persuasion, education, the building up of alternative institutions – in short, a far from inevitable process of social evolution driven by purposeful, but not centrally coordinated, human action, the results of which on the macro-level will not be of human design. It will take generations, but “anyone who fights for the future, lives in it today.”

6) If it is possible, however, so to work a structural change in the given order of being that we can be satisfied with it as a perfect one, then it becomes the task of the gnostic to seek out the prescriptions for such change. Knowledge – gnosis – of the method of altering being is the central concern of the gnostic. As the sixth feature of the gnostic attitude, therefore, we recognize the construction of a formula for self and world salvation, as well as the gnostic’s readiness to come forward as a prophet who will proclaim his knowledge about the salvation of mankind.

Even non-gnostic movements have their leaders and their “prophets.” Knowledge is necessary for any human endeavor. This is another feature that does not really add much by itself. Features 2-5 seem to do the bulk of the explanatory work. Taking all six features into consideration together, it seems we can say conclusively that liberalism, particularly Aristotelian liberalism, does not qualify as a gnostic political movement. Aristotelian liberalism is about liberty and human flourishing; it is no more gnostic than Aristotle’s ethical and political philosophy.

In answering the hypothetical charge of gnosticism, the charge of utopianism has partially been met as well. The conception of human nature presented in my dissertation is, I think, a realistic one and the ideal society envisioned does not require human nature somehow to be miraculously changed in order for it to be brought about and maintained. The ideal society is not a perfect one in an otherworldly Platonic or Christian sense. It will not bring Heaven on Earth or usher in the End of History. We do not seek to immanentize the eschaton.

I take the moral case to have been made fairly strongly in my dissertation, although the case can always be strengthened by fleshing the arguments out more fully and presenting more than time or space allowed there or in a blogpost. What I did not spend much time addressing in my dissertation is the question of practicality, which raises objections that are variations on the theme “it will never work.” Addressing this question is largely beyond the scope of my dissertation and this blogpost. I must restrict myself to saying a few things.

The moral/practical dichotomy does not sit well within Aristotelian philosophy. As I have argued elsewhere, Aristotelian virtue ethics, unlike most modern ethics, does not recognize a natural tension between what is moral and what is in one’s rational or enlightened self-interest. Immorality is never practical or in one’s rational self-interest in this view, even though a Hobbes or a Machiavelli would counsel otherwise. Moreover, if a critic is not convinced of the practicality, that does not by itself obviate the moral case; arguments need to be presented against the latter as well. This is simply a point about proper argumentation and should not be taken as implying an embrace of a theory/practice dichotomy. It is sometimes said, “Well, it’s good in theory but it doesn’t work in practice.” But this is nonsense. If a theory is inapplicable to reality, then it is not a good theory.

The various theories of statism have been making a royal mess of things for centuries now. Perhaps it is time to try something radically different. Ronald Hamowy has observed that “For at least two hundred years [owing to the Scottish Enlightenment], social philosophers have known that association does not need government, that, indeed, government is destructive of association.” Scottish Enlightenment thinkers like Adam Ferguson, David Hume, and Adam Smith as well as modern thinkers like Austrian economist F.A. Hayek have theorized about and described the emergence of society, culture, law, language, and markets as spontaneous orders. Austrian economists, libertarians, and others have built up a significant body of literature that demonstrates both theoretically and historically that legislative law and state-provided goods and services are inferior to other institutions in civil society: free markets and free enterprises, cultural norms, customary law and polycentric legal systems, and private organizations such as the family, churches, private schools, clubs, fraternal orders, and the like.

[Cross-posted at The Libertarian Standard.]

I found this brief restatement of what I take to be Ayn Rand’s epistemological argument against God in my files. I had jotted it down years ago  in college.

Existents have identity.                                                   E + I
Identity constitutes specific characteristics.              I + S
Infinity denotes unspecifiable characteristics.         N + ~S
If God is infinite, then God has no identity.              G + N > G + ~I
God is infinite.                                                                   G + N
Therefore, God has no identity.                                    G + ~I
Something has identity or it does not exist.              I v ~E
Therefore, God does not exist.                                      G + ~E

Basically, in her view, God is an invalid concept. He is indefinable, described by what he is not, by way of analogy, unique and therefore not within the conceptual realm (a concept involves reference to two or more concretes in reality). Infinity in the metaphysical or ontological sense used above (as opposed to its epistemological meaning, say in mathematics) is another invalid concept, since something that is infinite would not be limited by anything, would have characteristics that are unspecified; it is everything and therefore nothing (or, the concept omits everything and is therefore nothing); it is not definable.

This is from a page of notes I put together in grad school for a presentation on Aristotle’s Prime Mover.

Sources: De Anima III.5, Metaphysics XII (especially 7 & 9), Physics VIII (especially 8-10).

PDF version.

Characteristics of the Prime Mover (Divine Nous)

• First principle
• First mover (logically, not temporally); itself unmoved and unmovable/unalterable
• Substance (and arguably form) without matter
• Self-thinking thought
• Eternal and in eternal possession of its object (thought); therefore always active and never passive, always actuality and never potentiality.
• Simple and one
• Final cause; that for the sake of which; moves others by love; produces movement through infinite time (not a temporal first cause)
• Necessary
• Most good
• Living, insofar as thought itself is the highest expression of life
• No magnitude (and so neither finite nor infinite)
• Without parts and indivisible

The Ordered Universe

• “[T]he universe is of the nature of a whole” (M XII.1). “[T]he world is not such that one thing has nothing to do with another, but they are connected. For all are ordered together to one end” (M XII.10). “There always was motion and always will be motion throughout all time” (P XIII.9), i.e., the universe is eternal; not created or generated ex nihilo. The Prime Mover is the original source of motion in the universe and is the ordering principle that makes the universe a whole. The Prime Mover, God, the Divine, “encloses the whole of nature” (end of M XII.8).

Human Nous and Divine Nous

• Men participate in the divine insofar as they contemplate the higher things (Nicomachean Ethics and M XII.7).
• Can the human soul survive death? In Metaphysics XII.3 Aristotle suggests that it can, “albeit not all soul but [only] the reason.”

Contra Plato (M XII.5-6)

• For Plato everything in the phenomenal world is a mere imperfect, particular manifestation of the Ideas or Forms. Each Idea or Form is universal in the sense of being one. In Metaphysics XII (and also in NE), Aristotle rejects universals of this sort. “The primary principles of all things are the actual primary ‘this’ and another thing which exists potentially. The universal causes, then, of which we spoke do not exist. For the individual is the source of the individuals. For while man is the cause of man universally, there is no universal man” (M XII.5). For Plato, the Agathon (the Good), at least in the Symposium and the Republic and prior to the Sophist, is beyond being. One might argue that Plato’s “mature metaphysics” expressed in the Sophist precludes this, however.
• For Aristotle it is particulars that exist and the forms are always forms of individual particulars. Aristotle’s universals are not physically separable and independently existing things but rather are aspects of the nature of particulars, which we can separate out mentally by a process of abstraction. For example, the universal ‘man’ does not exist for Aristotle except insofar as it can be located in all the individual men who have ever lived, are living, or will ever live. The same might be said of the Prime Mover; insofar as it is the first mover, the organizing principle of the universe, and encloses the whole of nature, it might be reasonable to say (although I’m not certain that Aristotle would agree) that it is the form of reality, the logical structure of reality. Arguably the Metaphysics introduces separable substances, but even so for Aristotle nothing, not even the Prime Mover, is beyond being.

~~~

Now, I’m an atheist, but I believe there is a logical structure of reality. I don’t think my views are entirely inconsistent with Aristotle’s idea of the Prime Mover. For more on this, see Roderick Long’s “Theism and Atheism Reconciled” and “The Unspeakable Logos.”

A 10-year-old boy is taking a stand for “liberty and justice for all,” refusing to say the Pledge of Allegiance until gays and lesbians enjoy equal rights. Good for him. But this will be best achieved by getting the state out of marriage entirely. Let people define marriage how they will. Barring that, the second best option so long as the state monopolizes the definition and the legal system is to insist that the state has no right to limit marriage to opposite-sex unions, thus denying homosexuals equal legal rights, tax benefits, etc., within its auspices.

The state can never bring “liberty and justice for all” so it is incoherent, though a good rhetorical device, to make one’s pledging allegiance to it contingent on its doing so. Pledging allegiance is itself morally suspect insofar as it carries connotations of feudalism, and morally bankrupt insofar as allegiance is pledged to the state. I think it is no accident that the Pledge was not created until after the Civil War, in 1892, roughly a hundred years after the signing of the Constitution and not long before the US government’s first overseas imperial war. Nor that its creator, Francis Bellamy, was a statist-socialist intent on promoting nationalism in public indoctrination camps schools. (Incidentally, as an aside, the phrase “under God” wasn’t added to the Pledge until 1954, and “in God we trust” wasn’t the official US motto until 1956.)

From Gary North’s obituary for John Robbins:

Robbins first came to the attention of libertarians because of his self-published book, Answer to Ayn Rand (1974). He did not object to her defense of the free market. He objected to her epistemology, which rested on atheism.

I can see why he would think that, since for Christians God is at the level of metaphysics and ontology, in a sense prior to epistemology. However, while I can’t speak for Rand herself, for me at least my epistemology does not rest on my atheism. Rather, it is more the other way around. My atheism rests in part on my epistemological views (which inform and are informed by my metaphysical views, to be sure), but I (and I think Rand too) do not first assume God doesn’t exist and then develop my epistemology on that basis.

Don’t go to Dubai for business or vacation. Or the rest of the United Arab Emirates, for that matter. In fact, you’d be much safer avoiding even a layover or connecting flight there.

Why, you ask? You might be expecting me to give some answer related to terrorism or Islamism, but you’d be wrong. No, I recommend not going there because you can be arrested on the slightest and flimsiest of pretexts.

If you so much as step foot in the Dubai airport and walk around while awaiting your connecting flight’s departure, you could be arrested and sent to jail for a minimum of four years simply for having health supplement like melatonin (used for jet lag), which is even sold legally over the counter in Dubai and the US, or for having a few poppy seeds left over from a bread roll stuck to your clothing, or for having unknowingly stepped on a little bit of pot someone left on the ground, leaving a microscopic trace element lighter than a grain of sugar on the sole of your shoe. No, seriously. I’m not kidding. Check it out.

…against ignorant critics.

“Why attack ‘Compass’ but not C.S. Lewis?” by Jonathan D’Ambrosio (rogerebert.com Letters)

My own two cents: How many of you who denounced and/or boycotted the movie have actually read the book? How can you honestly criticize that which you have not read or seen?

“Look, I don’t know, maybe I haven’t made myself completely clear, so for the record, here it is again,” said the Lord, His divine face betraying visible emotion during a press conference near the site of the fallen Twin Towers. “Somehow, people keep coming up with the idea that I want them to kill their neighbor. Well, I don’t. And to be honest, I’m really getting sick and tired of it. Get it straight. Not only do I not want anybody to kill anyone, but I specifically commanded you not to, in really simple terms that anybody ought to be able to understand.”

Read the rest here.

There is a quasi-interview/article here at The Advocates for Self-Government website. See, also, Wright’s page on SFF.net.

I have only read Wright’s Golden Age trilogy, not any of his other novels. I can say that I greatly enjoyed the trilogy. Not only is it good science fiction but it is explicitly libertarian science fiction. There is a distinct Randian influence evident in the main character’s words and actions as well as in the setting and plot.

As a libertarian, I do have a few problems with the libertarian society Wright dramatizes, however. One is that I am skeptical of any government remaining as limited as his over such a long period of time. Unfortunately, Wright, quoted in the article, makes clear that he is not a “true-blue libertarian.” Whatever that means. But better mostly libertarian than mostly not. However, his description of the type of government he thought he had to create for his fictional world in order to make his plot possible makes me wonder how well he understands the nature of the state. How did his government get to be so ultra-minimalist and how did it manage to stay that way? Wright doesn’t provide an adequate explanation. The only workings of the government we are made directly privy to are the (literally) one man army and the “Supreme Court.”

The second major sticking point is a major plot device without which the novels would have been very different indeed. A major part of the ills that pervade Wright’s libertarian society stem from its universal and rigid acceptance of intellectual property rights. Like a good number of libertarians, albeit not a majority, I believe that intellectual property rights are illegitimate (see here and here). Remove them from Wright’s fictional world and many major problems stemming from them disappear. In a society of immortals the royalties accruing from intellectual property will be endless and bountiful. It is thus no surprise that Wright’s fictional society is dominated by a relative handful of mostly older immortals who are absurdly wealthy and control some of the most vital technology. In effect, their dominance is subsidized by the state. Given the obvious ills IP causes in the trilogy it wouldn’t have been difficult to have the main protagonists at least come to doubt its legitimacy, but alas.

But again, these quibbles aside, I enjoyed the books very much. They were well-written, imaginative, engrossing and very explicitly libertarian. At least one of the three books should have won the Prometheus Award. Perhaps this oversight will be rectified with a Hall of Fame or Special Award.

Given the strong Randian influence, it came as no surprise to me that Wright was an atheist while writing these books. In his own words, a “vehement, argumentative, proselytizing atheist.” I am disappointed to find out that he renounced his atheism, but glad that he survived the heart attack that precipitated his conversion to Christianity. Still, to speculate a bit, it is not so surprising to me that someone I would describe as a militant atheist would have a change of heart. It seems to me there is something similar psychologically about this kind of atheist and proselytizing, especially fundamentalist, Christians. There is something defensive about it* and that to me implies doubt. A mid-life crisis like a near-death experience can be powerful fertilizer for that seed. Ayn Rand was an atheist; not as a primary or starting point, however, but as a consequence of her philosophy. Hence, she described herself not as a militant atheist (or some similar combination of adjectives) but as an intransigent atheist.

*Granted religious conservatives and radical Islamists periodically give us reason to be defensive and even worried, but not enough in my mind to justify it dominating one’s life to the point one can be described as “vehement, argumentative, [and] proselytizing” (or militant).