Subjectivists sometimes reject this account of the disagreement on the grounds that the dispute about the is/ought gap is prior to the question about objective goods . The thought is that there would be no way of making sense of ‘objective good’ without appealing in some form to the idea of what an agent should or ought to pursue. No doubt some would-be defenders of objective goods do think that way, but one need not (and Aristotelians tend not to, it is worth mentioning). It is, rather, possible to give an account of what it is for something to be a basic objective good in terms of the basic teleological capacities that characterize any kind of being, and to maintain that any reasons for action that such a being could have are grounded in facts about the relationship between those kinds of action and the promotion, respect, and defense of those basic goods. Since reasons for action are, on this account, what make ‘should’ or ‘ought’ claims true, there can be objective goods whose objectivity is not a function of what any agent should or ought to do, but which instead provide the basis for what any agent should or ought to do.

Of course, all I’ve done here is to outline the conceptual structure of such a theory; I haven’t done anything to argue that there is a defensible view with that structure. I obviously think that there is (in fact I think there are several incompatible views with that basic structure, each of which is defensible in the minimal sense that intelligent, informed people of good will can give strong reasons in favor of them). My point here, though, is simply to try to clarify what the conceptual possibilities are, so that those who find the is/ought gap impossible to bridge might see that there are more alternative positions than they believe. It’s abundantly clear, for instance, that Xenu’s difficulties with ‘objective morality’ stem in large part from assumptions about what that would have to involve — namely, constraints on the action of all human beings, constraints which have their force regardless of what ends or goals any human being pursues. It’s pretty plain that the real dispute here is about objective goods and about the relationship between goods, reasons, and ‘ought’ claims.

Perhaps this helps?

I'll admit the full quote complicates the picture somewhat, but I do not think it seriously affects Veatch's point. Notice that Hume says he can only recognize the goodness or badness of something by the way he feels and he has to deliberately turn inward to examine that feeling. This fits with Veatch's characterization of the proofreader's mentality such that Hume has so trained himself that he cannot recognize virtue and vice when he sees it.

You say that Hume's feelings, apart from reason and the nature of the thing in question, do constitute a recognition of virtue and vice but I think Veatch would deny that it does. For Hume, it is merely a recognition about how he feels about something, not about what that something actually is, and it is only due to one's feelings that we can call anything virtuous or vicious. It's just emotivist "Yaying" and "Booing" borrowing the trappings of moral language.

It seems Veatch is strawmanning Hume. He uses the quote of Hume's to characterize him, as being, due the "proofreader's mentality", curiously unable to see virtue, vice and value which others can see so plainly; it's as if to say, "Silly Hume, the vice in willful murder may entirely escape him, because he's trained himself not to see it." Veatch even characterizes Hume as someone who wouldn't find any virtue in the character of Socrates.

This strawman is made possible by the fact that Veatch doesn't quote Hume's full argument on the matter. Here's the last sentence Veatch quoted following by the rest of the argument (emphasis added):

"The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till you turn your reflection into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but `tis the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object. So that when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it."

So, Hume does recognize virtue, vice, and value. And presumably he would be disgusted by a willful murder and be inspired by the courage of Socrates. He is simply saying that the value implied by such disgust and inspiration would reside in his heart's response to the murder and of Socrates and not within the qualities of the objects themselves.

RE: Searle. Searle is on my list, but near the bottom. I was researching Philippa Foot and stumbled across his essay; its a quick read and puts a considerable dent in the “hard is/ought gap” case.

He seems to be influenced by Wittgenstein, Austin and Anscombe; which supports a case that he is in the Aristotelean camp.

This should make any integration of his ideas enjoyable; I know Prof. Long has written well of him.

Take care,

-J

I confess I still haven’t taken the time to read up on Searle yet. Thanks for the link.

“Eventually, down at the very core, we have some “ought” that is not derivable from observation or nature.”

I disagree.

“Whether it be “do no harm” or “non-aggression” or something else, it is not derivable from reason.”

Again, I disagree. I also object to the “from reason” part. Sounds Kantian. “By reason” is more accurate.

From the rest, it sounds vaguely like you reject categorical imperatives and embrace hypothetical imperatives. We’re in agreement on this much. The type of hypothetical imperative you discuss, however, is called a problematic hypothetical imperative (IF-THEN). I do not think these can serve as a fundamental basis for ethics. For that, you need an assertoric hypothetical imperative (SINCE-THEN). On this and naturalist ethics see my dissertation and the sources I cite therein.

Regarding Hume’s emotivism: No, I think it is woefully inadequate for ethical theory. See chapter 10 of Roderick Long’s Wittgenstein, Austrian Economics, and the Logic of Action for one devastating criticism of emotivism. Of course, I also find his metaphysics and epistemology to be greatly flawed.

“Or I could take a theory-of-mind attack–at what point does a robot become sentient/complex enough for such “objective morality” to apply?”

That’s more of an empirical/practical question, not really a challenge of the rationality criterion. I’m not sure I have the expertise to answer it. Maybe nobody does at this point. I don’t think any computer or robot has achieved a rational faculty yet. When/if any do, then I think they must be classified as persons (or moral agents).

“What if a human is made complete in every way except without any care of others (no moral sense–pure sociopathy)? What if an entire planet was populated by such a ruthless sort–what would even be the meaning or point of morals to them and how would they even “discover” them?”

Would such a being even be human any longer? How would such a being be made? What would be the meaning of morals to such a being? At the very least: survival. But probably more: surviving well, or flourishing (in some fashion).

If an entire planet were populated by such a ruthless sort, I think it would quickly become severely depopulated as they kill each other off, perhaps to extinction. If they are not too mentally defective. maybe eventually the few remaining survivors would discover rules of social conduct that enable them to better achieve their ends and they would adhere to them with a ruthless efficiency. If they are so defective that even this would be impossible for them, then I daresay they probably do not qualify as rational.

Thanks for the link to your dissertation; as you commented once, I think, on Roderick T. Long's blog once (paraphrase), "Thanks for free education."

I think John R. Searle's quick and clean derivation of an ought from an is, here: http://tinyurl.com/lz3cyt, is not the whole story, by no means, but it does vindicate your and Veatch's position (mine as well) and significantly pushes the "burden of proof/rejoinder" into the dichotomists court.

Happy Blogging and congratulations Doctor,

-J

Now, if you already hold a particular ought or goal, then an ought can have a truth distinction if it helps you reach that goal. “I ought to take aspirin” is “true” if your goal is to get rid of your headache. If I have a headache, and if I take aspirin, then I will lose my headache. I don’t want a head, therefore, I should take aspirin…

Perhaps I “suffer” from “oughtism.” I’m not convinced the is-ought gap is ultimately breachable in its strongest form.

Or I could take a theory-of-mind attack–at what point does a robot become sentient/complex enough for such “objective morality” to apply? We certainly don’t treat out computers as having any moral status; but what about AI? Why do you choose this criteria? Or do you deny nonhuman consciousness or at least machine consciousness?

What if a human is made complete in every way except without any care of others (no moral sense–pure sociopathy)? What if an entire planet was populated by such a ruthless sort–what would even be the meaning or point of morals to them and how would they even “discover” them?

It’s pretty strange that people that tend to argue for objective morality argue for an objective morality strangely in line with an evolution-produced human nature and conception of things. I don’t see how just because something IS, it MUST ACT in any particular way, ultimately. I certainly don’t see why human moral sense deserves some sort of status of being intrinsic to the universe.

Hume’s emotivism (at least that how I understand it) seems pretty solid to me…

And I will say, as a disclaimer, that I am a full-blown libertarian, not the petty LP/vulgar type of the Bob Barrian infection but an uncompromising voluntaryist. How do I argue my ethical stance to others, then? Either by trying to find what’s really important to others, finding a sort of “central premise” to their morality, and trying to go from there, or giving up on them entirely and realizing they’ll always be an ideological enemy on the battlefield of life.

Most of us have some sort of agreement that we want to be free. The trick is is to get others to agree that libertarianism is true freedom, and to cultivate a respect of the freedom of others.

Yes, and I find it perplexing that Stephan Kinsella can see the distinction between possession/control and ownership clearly enough to criticize mutualists and Georgists over it with regard to absentee ownership, while he cannot see that his own account of rights makes the mistake of collapsing this distinction.